Rationality vs Reality: The Dissonance between Economic Models and Experimental Data by Broda, Piotr
College of the Holy Cross
CrossWorks
Honors Theses Honors Projects
4-2017
Rationality vs Reality: The Dissonance between
Economic Models and Experimental Data
Piotr Broda
College of the Holy Cross, psbrod17@g.holycross.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://crossworks.holycross.edu/honors
Part of the Behavioral Economics Commons, and the Psychology Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Honors Projects at CrossWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Honors Theses by an
authorized administrator of CrossWorks.
Recommended Citation







Rationality​ ​vs​ ​Reality: 

























College​ ​Honors​ ​Program 
Advisor:​ ​Professor​ ​Mark​ ​Hallahan 






Rationality was not embedded in economic theory from its onset. In fact, the discipline              
started with a more holistic approach to human nature, incorporating notions of empathy and              
altruism. It was not until economics progressed and became more concerned with mathematical             
models and abstract theories that rationality entered the fray. Game theory, developed in the              
1940s, established several axioms about human behavior that presented people as perfectly            
rational economic agents. It was not until behavioral researchers started investigating the            
question of rationality that the economic worldview was critically challenged. This research was             
the driving force in the development of behavioral economics. In particular, ultimatum game             
experiments demonstrate systematic deviations from rational decision-making. As more and          
more research has emerged documenting how observed human behavior challenges the           
predictions of neoclassical economic theory, mainstream economics has begun incorporating          
these ideas. The discipline has refined existing models while also developing new ones that go               
back to the roots of the field. Economic agents are no longer concerned only with themselves,                
but also with the welfare of others. After a substantial narrowing of scope, economics is               
broadening​ ​its​ ​view​ ​in​ ​conjunction​ ​with​ ​psychological​ ​theories.   
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Defining the field of economics can prove deceptively difficult because even introductory            
texts differ in how they explain the discipline. Mankiw, a renowned economics professor at              
Harvard University defines economics as “the study of how society manages its scarce             
resources”(2014, p. 4). This view has a wide scope which could partially be explained by the                1
fact that the quote comes from a macroeconomics textbook, but it still fails to encompass all the                 
components of economic theory. On the other end of the spectrum is a quote from Krugman, a                 
professor at Princeton University and frequent contributor to the ​New York Times​, who claims              
that economics is the “study of those phenomena that can be understood as emerging from the                
interactions among intelligent, self-interested individuals” (1999, p. 17). Here the definition           2
focuses on the individual as an economic agent and the role each person plays in the aggregate.                 
Krugman’s emphasis on the individual is an important distinction because it implies that human              
behavior is a necessary component to studying economics. By underlining the importance of             
human behavior, he demonstrates that psychology has a place in economics. A simplified version              
of Krugman’s definition would say economics is the study of human behavior in a marketplace.               
However, he diminishes the power of his argument by stating that individuals are self-interested.              
Either the quote is too limiting, claiming that economics can only study (or account for) the                
actions​ ​of​ ​self-interested​ ​people,​ ​or​ ​it​ ​assumes​ ​that​ ​everyone​ ​is​ ​self-interested.  
1​ ​Mankiw,​ ​N.​ ​G.​ ​(2014).​​ ​Principles​ ​of​ ​Macroeconomics​ ​​(p.​ ​4).​ ​Cengage​ ​Learning. 




The term “self-interest” has its economic roots in the writings of Adam Smith who is               
considered to be the founding father of economics. Writing in the late 18th century, Smith               
mentions that people act according to their self-interest. However, he did not mean to say that                
people are notoriously selfish. The two terms should not be considered synonymous, yet             
colloquially they are considered interchangeable. Smith is often taken out of context when             
economists quote his work. The emergence of self-interest, and later rationality, can be traced              
through the history of economic thought. As economics progressed, Smith’s views were            
distorted,​ ​and​ ​ultimately​ ​their​ ​true​ ​essence​ ​was​ ​lost​ ​to​ ​most.  
Smith held a holistic view of economics, incorporating ideas of individual behavior,            
social pressures, justice, and government into his works. He was writing at a time when               
economics was not even an established discipline yet- the field was still intertwined with              
political science and thus called political economy. The overarching trajectory of economics            
outlines a narrowing of scope. The field did not maintain the macroscopic view akin to Smith’s                
for long. In addition, as the perspective of economics narrowed, it also moved into the abstract                
realm. This is the natural tendency for a new and blossoming discipline; however, the theory               
began to incorporate too many assumptions. The power of this phenomenon is seen in              
Krugman’s definition when he writes that economics arises from “self-interested individuals.”           
According to economists, questions of morality and human behavior were addressed using            
mathematical equations. Yet, these formulae proved to be too reductionist in their applications.             




The emphasis on perfectly rational economic agents did not go unchallenged for long.             
Research in the 1970s, primarily in psychology, led to the emergence of behavioral economics.              
This relatively young field looks at economics from a psychological lens and attempts to explain               
the observed departures from rationality in various studies. Dan Ariely, a prominent psychologist             
and behavioral economist at Duke University, explains that behavioral economics flips           
neoclassical economic thinking on its head. The discipline extracts a theory of behavior after              
interpreting experimental results rather than hypothesizing behavior based on theoretical models           
(2010). Moreover, he argues that despite many behaviors being classified as irrational, at least in               3
an economic sense, they can still be modeled since they are systematic and predictable deviations               
from​ ​rationality.  
The rise of behavioral economics was not a straightforward path. Initially, economists            
treated the experimental findings as mere anomalies; the market would be able to compensate for               
these errors of rationality in the aggregate. However, as Ariely pointed out, many of the               
behaviors are universal and consistently irrational so they will not disappear, even if analyzing              
the market on a macroscopic scale. It was not until the late 1990s that models of social                 
preferences began to receive attention in economic literature. Researchers were beginning to            
move away from the notion that economic actors only acted to maximize their own welfare;               
individuals​ ​also​ ​care​ ​about​ ​the​ ​benefits​ ​to​ ​society​ ​and​ ​others.  
As research in behavioral economics started to gain traction and recognition in the             
scholarly community, experiments focused on particular demographics and their patterns of           
behavior. One of the most interesting discrepancies demonstrates statistically significant          




differences in behavior between economics majors and non-majors. For instance, economics           
students tend to be less generous in some experimental tasks, they downplay the role of fairness                
in decision making, and they deviate from socially optimal outcomes. In fact, the economists’              
judgments and decisions in these experiments were closer to the predicted outcomes of economic              
models; they were acting more “rationally.” At first glance, this finding seems rather obvious and               
trivial. The individuals studying economics were more likely to select the economically correct             
choice or response. On the other hand, the trend is worrying because it suggests that traditional                
economic models can only accurately predict behavior of those who have studied economics, or              
in general, more “rationally” inclined individuals and fails to account for the rest of the               
population.  
This circles back to Krugman’s definition of economics. Does he mean that the discipline              
can only predict behavior of self-interested individuals, or does he presume that all people are               
self-interested? The latter assumption has been refuted by behavioral economics: not everyone is             
self-interested and individuals do not always act in a self-interested manner. Furthermore, the             
demographic data support the hypothesis that economics predicts behaviors given that the agent             
is​ ​a​ ​rational​ ​decision-maker.  
My thesis traces the emergence of self-interest and rationality as two major buzzwords in              
economics. Economics began with a holistic view of society and considered the whole person,              
including emotions and morality, within its scope. The stronger reliance on mathematics led to a               
narrowing of the discipline by reducing much of human behavior to equations. Fortunately, with              
the recent development in behavioral economics, and even fields like neuroeconomics,           
economics as a whole is broadening its perspective again. Human behavior is more complex than               
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neoclassical models suggest. Furthermore, I investigate whether the difference in behavior           
between economics majors and other students can be explained by learning and education or              
through a self-selection process. In other words, do individuals learn to be more “rational” thanks               
to the economics courses in their college career or are they already inclined to process               
information in a more “rational” manner? I argue that in order for economics to progress and                
develop stronger models, it must accommodate the psychological and behavioral economic           




Chapter​ ​One:​ ​Tracing​ ​the​ ​Progression​ ​of​ ​Economics 
 
The popular image of economics has become associated with business and the world of              
finance but the discipline encompasses much more than that. When thinking about economics,             
notions like greed and selfishness emerge quite readily. Despite economics dealing primarily            
with human action, much of the research and theory surrounding contemporary economics has             
overlooked psychology. Interestingly, economics was not always such a narrow field. Adam            
Smith, the first “modern” economic writer, wrote about a comprehensive social structure which             
incorporated concepts from psychology, political science, and philosophy before some of these            
disciplines even formally existed. In fact, Kenneth Boulding, an economist in the mid-20th             
century, points out that Smith was a professor of moral philosophy at Glasgow and the theory of                 
economics emerged out of that discipline (1969). In addition, some of the research done in the                4
last thirty years has integrated psychological theories resulting in the emergence of behavioral             
economics.  
Adam​ ​Smith 
Adam Smith’s stance on economic theory is often misconstrued because modern           
economics takes his words out of context. Arguably, Smith’s most famous work is ​The Wealth of                
Nations ​written in 1776. However, fewer people are aware of his other writings, in particular,               
The Theory of Moral Sentiments ​which predates ​The Wealth of Nations ​by almost 20 years. In                
fact, Smith emphasized the importance of ​The Theory of Moral Sentiments by revising it six               
4​ ​Boulding,​ ​K.​ ​E.​ ​(1969).​ ​Economics​ ​as​ ​a​ ​Moral​ ​Science.​ ​​The​ ​American​ ​Economic​ ​Review​,​ ​​59​(1),​ ​1-12. 
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times throughout his life and even claiming that it was more crucial to read than ​The Wealth of                  
Nations ​(Ross, 2010). To fully comprehend Smith’s perspective on economics, his two works             5
should​ ​be​ ​read​ ​and​ ​analyzed​ ​in​ ​conjunction.  
To understand ​The Wealth of Nations requires some historical context. Despite being            
called the founding father of economics, economic thought was alive well before Smith started              
writing. Even Greek philosophers such as Aristotle were writing about economic issues.            
Immediately before Adam Smith, the reigning economic thought was established by the            
mercantilists from the 16th century. Mercantilists emphasized the importance of gold and the             
size of the treasury. Therefore, the mercantile class encouraged exports and abhorred imports.             
The accumulation of wealth depended on hoarding gold by selling goods to other nations.              
England was not endowed with the natural resource of gold. Their only method of acquiring the                
precious metal, which also served as the global currency at the time, was to sell to foreign                 
nations. Exporting had a twofold effect, such that it increased the gold in the home country’s                
treasury and reduced the amount of gold in the foreign nation. This also explains why the                
mercantilists​ ​disliked​ ​imports;​ ​purchasing​ ​foreign​ ​goods​ ​reduced​ ​the​ ​domestic​ ​amount​ ​of​ ​gold.  
Additionally, they argued that wages must be kept only at a subsistence level. Ironically,              
to maximize national income, workers’ incomes were kept at a minimum. Thus, the epitome of               
mercantilism can be summarized by Mandeville when he writes “In a free nation… the surest               
wealth consists in a multitude of laborious poor” (as cited in Marx, 2007, p. 674). Hence, Smith                 6
titles his second book not just ​The Wealth of Nations but ​An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes                  
of the Wealth of Nations​. Smith wrote the book as a critique of mercantilist thought and its                 
5​ ​Ross,​ ​I.​ ​S.​ ​(2010).​ ​​The​ ​Life​ ​of​ ​Adam​ ​Smith.​​ ​Oxford​ ​University​ ​Press. 
6​ ​de​ ​Mandeville,​ ​B.​ ​(1728).​ ​​The​ ​Fable​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Bees​.​ ​London.​ ​In​ ​Marx,​ ​K.​ ​(2007).​ ​​Capital:​ ​A​ ​Critique​ ​Of​ ​Political 
Economy​ ​-​ ​The​ ​Process​ ​Of​ ​Capitalist​ ​Production.​​ ​Cosimo. 
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restrictions on trade, arguing that the wealth of a nation is determined not by its vast treasury, but                  
by its labor force and its ability to produce and consume. It is not sufficient to merely measure                  
the labor force but also its production levels and the amount of consumption per capita in the                 
market.  
Simply looking at the titles of Smith’s books offers the reader a glimpse of their main                
focus. ​The Theory of Moral Sentiments​, from the onset, does not sound like a book on                
economics. Though the work is predominantly filled with philosophical discourse, Smith uses it             
as a foundation for ​The Wealth of Nations​. ​The Theory of Moral Sentiments deals with human                
nature and behavior in the marketplace, laying down the general groundwork, whereas the             
“sequel”​ ​concentrates​ ​on​ ​details.  
Before commencing the breakdown of ​The Wealth of Nations​, it is imperative to first put               
into context Smith’s magnum opus, ​The Theory of Moral Sentiments. Smith begins the book by               
stating, “How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his               
nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him,                
though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it” (2010, p.7). Smith               7
immediately claims that people have an intrinsically altruistic tendency. Despite appearing           
selfish, men still care for their neighbors because seeing others’ pleasure brings them personal              
pleasure. He describes how empathy drives the need to help others. Incorporating such rhetoric              
seems counterintuitive to the rational agent model now commonplace in modern economics.            
Economic agents are thought to be devoid of emotion, acting only in their self-interest. However,               
this​ ​misconception​ ​comes​ ​from​ ​economists’​ ​misconstrued​ ​notions​ ​of​ ​Smith.  
7​ ​Smith,​ ​A.​ ​(2010).​ ​​The​ ​Theory​ ​of​ ​Moral​ ​Sentiments​ ​​(p.​ ​7).​ ​Penguin. 
 
Broda​ ​11 
When asserting that individuals act in their own self-interest, Smith did not imply that              
people do not care for others. Self-interest is not a synonym for selfishness. In fact, Smith                
highlighted the significance of cooperation within a society. Specialization and division of labor             
cannot be sustained outside a collaborative community. One of Smith’s most famous quotes is              
regularly misinterpreted. He writes, “It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or                
the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own self-interest” (2007, p.                 
15). From this statement, readers gather that the laborers work not for the welfare of society, but                 8
because of their egocentrism. However, that does not seem like the logical conclusion. The baker               
cannot disassociate himself from the community since his responsibilities consist of only baking             
bread. How can he receive the clothes on his back, the wood in his stove, and the roof over his                    
head? Other contributing members of society provide those resources. It is thus in the baker’s               
self-interest to bake because otherwise, he would have nothing to contribute to the market and               
therefore​ ​have​ ​no​ ​money​ ​to​ ​procure​ ​those​ ​other​ ​goods.  
The misinterpretation of Smith’s parable could be mitigated by simply reading the            
sentence following the previous quote: “We address ourselves not to their humanity but to their               
self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities, but of their advantages” (2007, p. 15).                 9
The focal point of ​The Wealth of Nations posits that specialization of labor is the most efficient                 
use of resources in the economy. For instance, the bakers bake and sell their wares to buy                 
vegetables from the farmers and fish from the fishermen. Smith insists on the natural human               
tendency to barter and exchange goods and services. He clarifies in the above quote that although                
people are altruistic we cannot rely on infinite charity. This corresponds to a term now known as                 
8​ ​Smith,​ ​A.​ ​(2005).​ ​​Wealth​ ​of​ ​Nations​ ​​(p.​ ​15).​ ​​ ​JSTOR. 
9​ ​Smith.​ ​WN.​ ​(2005)​ ​p.​ ​15 
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donor fatigue- individuals will not continue giving generous contributions without further           
incentives. Therefore, Smith asserts that we capitalize on everyone’s advantages and specialize            
in​ ​whichever​ ​skill​ ​we​ ​perform​ ​best.  
This model demonstrates interdependence rather than underscoring independence and         
egocentrism. Already, there is a drastic departure from the mercantilist ideology. Smith does not              
mention “the laborious poor.” Instead, he insists that workers are the source of wealth in an                
economy; increasing their productivity will increase the income and, in turn, the welfare of the               
nation. The economy does not grow at the expense of the poor, it grows with them, because of                  
them. In fact, Smith begins ​The Wealth of Nations by writing, “The annual labour of every                
nation is the fund which originally supplies it with all the necessaries and conveniences of life                
which it annually consumes, and which consist always either in the immediate produce of that               
labour, or in what is purchased with that produce from other nations” (2005, p. 1). Similarly to                 10
the first lines of ​The Theory of Moral Sentiments​, Smith indicates the main purpose of his book                 
without delay. His aim to refute the mercantilist point of view is clear. As mentioned earlier,                
Smith wants to make clear we measure the value of an economy through the “necessaries and                
conveniences”​ ​produced​ ​by​ ​the​ ​labor​ ​force​ ​or​ ​via​ ​imports,​ ​not​ ​just​ ​by​ ​the​ ​labor​ ​force​ ​itself.  
Thus far, Smith appears idealistic and slightly unrealistic in his description of the world.              
There are obviously instances of greed, selfishness, and disregard for others present in society.              
He addresses these vices and shortfalls of human nature as well, incorporating the complexity of               
human behavior and reasoning into both his books. His major criticism of the human experience               
is that an individual’s incentive to become rich often overwhelms the mind and downplays the               
10​ ​Smith.​ ​WN.​ ​(2005)​ ​p.​ ​1 
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incentive to do good. “The rich man glories in his riches,” he writes, “because he feels that they                  
naturally draw upon him the attention of the world” (2010, p.50). People strive for fame and                11
fortune, and if they achieve it, they feel compelled to flaunt it to the world. Therefore, Smith                 
concludes, the end goal of acquiring wealth is not the fortune itself, because there can always be                 
more assets in the bank. Rather, “it is the vanity [of being wealthy], not the ease, or the pleasure,                   
which interests us” (2010, p.50). In other words, Smith argues that human nature moves us to                12
seek the affirmation of others. The rich want to be recognized whereas the poor want to stay out                  
of the spotlight. He goes on to state that “wealth and greatness are mere trinkets of frivolous                 
utility,”(2010,​ ​p.181)​ ​​ ​again​ ​undermining​ ​the​ ​strong​ ​urge​ ​to​ ​pursue​ ​wealth​ ​at​ ​all​ ​costs.   13
Perhaps the strongest evidence for Smith’s criticism of the pursuit of wealth comes from              
his parable about the poor man’s son. In the story, the son aspires to greatness and believes that                  
becoming rich will let him achieve that goal. He toils day and night for years, working several                 
jobs with little rest. The son earns his money and increases his fortune but at an extreme cost. At                   
a relatively young age, he is worn out and feeble. Despite being rich, he is still discontented with                  
his life. Lying on his deathbed, the poor man’s son realizes that he has wasted away his youth on                   
amassing wealth which, in the end, is devoid of significant meaning. Smith asserts that this               
misguided drive to pursue riches stems from the spectator- the inner voice inside a person’s mind                
that can be equated with consciousness of the self. Furthermore, Smith claims that, “He [the               
spectator] does not even imagine that they are really happier than other people; but he imagines                
that they possess more means of happiness” (2010, p.182). Now Smith is connecting the              14
11​ ​​ ​Smith.​ ​TMS.​ ​(2010)​ ​p.​ ​50 
12​ ​Smith.​ ​TMS.​ ​(2010)​ ​p.​ ​50 
13​ ​Smith.​ ​TMS.​ ​(2010)​ ​p.​ ​181 
14​ ​Smith.​ ​TMS.​ ​(2010)​ ​p.​ ​182 
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ambition for material wealth to the concept of happiness. Namely, he denies the adage “money               
can buy happiness.” Money can buy goods and services that evoke happiness, but wealth itself               
does not increase happiness. For Smith, becoming rich is not the point of working arduously.               
Though ambition and competition are important to him, they should not supersede compassion             
for others and one’s self. Additionally, it is important to note that Smith describes the poor man’s                 
journey as one of “unrelenting industry” as he strives to “acquire talents superior to all his                
competitors” (2010, p.181). Thus, Smith insists that competition and labor are the means by              15
which to gain wealth. It is not at the expense of others, as mercantilists may have suggested, but                  
through perspiration and determination. The young man struggles but rightfully earns his money             
by​ ​his​ ​own​ ​merit.  
This theme of critiquing the pursuit of wealth is found throughout ​The Theory of Moral               
Sentiments​. Smith writes, “the candidates for fortune too frequently abandon the paths of virtue”              
(2010, p.64). The philosophical side of Smith emerges again as he speaks about virtue and               16
moral character. These ideas are not typically associated with Smith’s teachings, yet they are a               
prominent feature in his writings. His comprehensive economic structure incorporated the           
essential human notions of morality and virtue. Moreover, Smith states that “In the race for               
wealth, and honors, and preferments, he may run as hard as he can, and strain every nerve and                  
every muscle, in order to outstrip all his competitors. But if he should justle, or throw down any                  
of them, the indulgence of the spectators is entirely at an end. It is a violation of fair play, which                    
they cannot admit of” (2010, p.83). Smith stands by his view that every society requires an                17
established system of justice and a respect for it. People must uphold a certain moral code in                 
15​ ​Smith.​ ​TMS.​ ​(2010)​ ​p.​ ​181 
16​ ​Smith.​ ​TMS.​ ​(2010)​ ​p.​ ​64 
17​ ​Smith.​ ​TMS.​ ​(2010)​ ​p.​ ​83 
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order for the society to function properly. Hard work should be appreciated and those who cheat                
or exploit others will be scorned and punished justly. Otherwise, without appropriate            
repercussions, the race to wealth will tempt people to abandon paths of virtue and result in a                 
corrupted​ ​community.  
This overview of Smith challenges the short excerpts most people read in introductory             
economics textbooks. Though ​The Wealth of Nations ​was revolutionary in its time by redefining              
how markets and economies grow, it did not provide a full picture of what Smith had in mind. It                   
is important to remember that Smith wished for people to read both his works together for a                 
complete​ ​understanding​ ​of​ ​the​ ​markets​ ​and​ ​political​ ​economy.  
Ashraf, Camerer, and Loewenstein (2005) voice even stronger opinions on Smith’s two            
books in asserting that Smith can actually be considered to be a behavioral economist by today’s                
standards. He combined economics and psychology into a complete framework, even before            18
modern psychology, or economics for that matter, had emerged. Some of Smith’s insights have              
actually been verified by recent experimental research. For instance, in ​The Theory of Moral              
Sentiments, ​Smith writes, “Pain...is, in almost all cases, a more pungent sensation than the              
opposite and correspondent pleasure” (2010, p.176). This concept, coined by Kahneman and            19
Tversky in 1979, is loss aversion. People are hurt more by a loss than by a corresponding gain; a                   
utility curve is not mirrored across the axis. Smith wrote about this phenomenon in the 18th                
century, yet it only became a revolutionary idea in economics when Kahneman and Tversky              
“discovered”​ ​the​ ​effect​ ​using​ ​experimental​ ​methods.  
18​ ​Ashraf,​ ​N.,​ ​Camerer,​ ​C.​ ​F.,​ ​&​ ​Loewenstein,​ ​G.​ ​(2005).​ ​Adam​ ​Smith,​ ​Behavioral​ ​Economist.​ ​​The​ ​Journal​ ​of 
Economic​ ​Perspectives​,​ ​​19​(3),​ ​131-145. 
19​ ​Smith.​ ​TMS.​ ​(2010)​ ​p.​ ​176 
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Smith touches on aspects of human nature and altruism that quickly get lost in the study                
of economics. By adding a time dimension to decision making, people are torn between two               
choices- an immediate but minor pleasure, or a much greater one but far in the future. Smith                 
refers to this dilemma as another example of the struggle between passions and the impartial               
spectator (2010). The impartial spectator can weigh the increased benefits of waiting, but             20
passions are myopic and seek immediate gratification. This is akin to the concept of a dual                
process model in behavioral economics; Thaler and Shefrin (1981) call it the fight between a               21
doer and a planner, whereas Laibson (1997) refers to the phenomenon as a “quasi-hyperbolic              22
discounting model.” Recent research has gone so far as to conduct brain scans involving such               
decisions, and the data indicate that different regions of the cortex are activated depending on the                
timeframe​ ​of​ ​the​ ​choice​ ​(McClure​ ​et​ ​al.,​ ​2004).  23
Smith may have incorporated moral philosophy into his writings on economics, but the             
discipline did not head in that direction. Future writers relate back to Smith, acknowledging his               
eminent presence in economics; however, they fail to to include a comprehensive overview of              
the field like Smith. Surely they allude to human nature, but they do not have the same grasp of                   
behavior and emotion that Smith referenced in his works. It is not difficult to imagine why                
current economists have a narrow understanding of Smith if even one generation down his              
Theory​ ​of​ ​Moral​ ​Sentiments​ ​​​ ​was​ ​overlooked.  
20​ ​Smith.​ ​TMS.​ ​(2010)​ ​p.​ ​272 
21​ ​Thaler,​ ​R.​ ​H.,​ ​&​ ​Shefrin,​ ​H.​ ​M.​ ​(1981).​ ​An​ ​Economic​ ​Theory​ ​Of​ ​Self-control.​ ​​The​ ​Journal​ ​of​ ​Political​ ​Economy​, 
392-406. 
22​ ​Laibson,​ ​D.​ ​(1997).​ ​Golden​ ​Eggs​ ​And​ ​Hyperbolic​ ​Discounting.​ ​​The​ ​Quarterly​ ​Journal​ ​of​ ​Economics​,​ ​443-477. 
23​ ​McClure,​ ​S.​ ​M.,​ ​Laibson,​ ​D.​ ​I.,​ ​Loewenstein,​ ​G.,​ ​&​ ​Cohen,​ ​J.​ ​D.​ ​(2004).​ ​Separate​ ​Neural​ ​Systems​ ​Value 
Immediate​ ​And​ ​Delayed​ ​Monetary​ ​Rewards.​ ​​Science​,​ ​​306​(5695),​ ​503-507. 
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David​ ​Ricardo  
The prominent writer on political economy after Smith was David Ricardo. Ricardo was             
an English economist and member of Parliament who became involved with economic theory             
after reading Smith. Many of his writings deal with the contemporary issues facing the English               
economy such as the tariffs on corn, and the depreciation of bank notes. His most noteworthy                24
book, however, is ​The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation. Written in 1817, the text               
attempts to explain the appropriate price for labor and how income is distributed. Furthermore,              
the book presents economics in a narrower light than Smith, excluding much of the philosophy               
and​ ​quasi-psychology​ ​found​ ​in​ ​​The​ ​Theory​ ​of​ ​Moral​ ​Sentiments.  
The major question on the minds of economists at the time was the valuation of               
commodities and labor. Ricardo begins ​The Principles of Political Economy ​and Taxation ​by             
explaining how goods get their value and then connects that idea to the theory of wages. He                 
writes, “Commodities derive their exchangeable value from two sources: from their scarcity, and             
from the quantity of labor required to obtain them” (Ricardo, 1891, p. 8). The latter part of the                  25
statement affirms what Smith posited in ​The Wealth of Nations​- the cost of production              
determines the value of a good. Ricardo further expands this claim by including costs of creating                
the capital to then produce a final good and the associated upstream costs. It should be noted that                  
both Smith and Ricardo so far have concentrated on the supply side of economics. They focus on                 
24​ ​Ricardo,​ ​D.​ ​(1811).​ ​​The​ ​High​ ​Price​ ​of​ ​Bullion:​ ​A​ ​Proof​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Depreciation​ ​of​ ​Bank​ ​Notes​​ ​(Vol.​ ​19,​ ​No.​ ​1).​ ​John 
Murray,​ ​32,​ ​Fleet-Street;​ ​Ricardo,​ ​D.​ ​(1815).​ ​​An​ ​Essay​ ​on​ ​the​ ​Influence​ ​of​ ​a​ ​Low​ ​Price​ ​of​ ​Corn​ ​on​ ​the​ ​Profits​ ​of 
Stock​​ ​(Vol.​ ​4,​ ​pp.​ ​1-41).​ ​J.​ ​Murray. 




scarcity and costs as the determinants of value, rather than individual preferences. Demand side              
economics​ ​does​ ​not​ ​emerge​ ​for​ ​a​ ​few​ ​more​ ​decades.  
Ricardo diverges from Smith’s inclusion of morality and virtue when it comes to his              
subsistence theory of wages, which later came to be known as the Iron Law of Wages. Whereas                 
Smith argues that in the short run wages will rise due to the goodwill of the people, leading to                   
higher production and more loyal workers, Ricardo holds a harsher view of wages in the long                
term. He asserts that increasing wages because of benevolence will ultimately backfire. With             
more disposable income, workers will be able to afford more luxuries and have the ability to                
raise more children. This increase in population size will translate to a larger supply of workers.                
According to the model, wages would subsequently decrease due to the increase in labor. So               
after only one generation, wages will have dropped back down. Thus, Ricardo argues, the natural               
price of labor is a subsistence wage. Any more than that and the influx of workers down the road                   
will decrease wages. Moreover, Ricardo tells a macabre account of how wages will stabilize. He               
states that when the market price for labor is below its natural price, laborers will live in poverty.                  
The only way to resolve the situation is for the labor force to decrease, which has to happen                  
given that people will be working for less than a subsistence level, or the demand for labor has to                   
increase. This dark view is a stark departure from Smith’s writings on goodwill and a morally                26
just society. Although Ricardo’s writings do not indicate the emergence of the rational thinking              
model​ ​found​ ​in​ ​modern​ ​economics,​ ​there​ ​is​ ​already​ ​a​ ​departure​ ​from​ ​moral​ ​philosophy.  
Although Ricardo developed the Iron Law of Wages, he did not believe this was the               
proper allocation of wealth in an economy. He claimed that distribution of income was culturally               
26​ ​Ricardo.​ ​(1891)​ ​p.​ ​8 
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dependent, a sentiment that arose from living during the feudal system. The Iron Law of Wages                
illustrates how wages will equilibrate to subsistence levels and landlords will collect massive             
amounts of money from the laborers. Ricardo was not content with the notion that the landlords                
amassed wealth at the expense of the farmers. Thus, he asserted that the rents received by the                 
landowners be taxed and then redistributed to the poor. So Ricardo proposed the grim, long run                
equilibrium of the Iron Law of Wages but was not satisfied with its results. He was not entirely                  
eliminating morality from his economic worldview. However, his model indicates a pivotal step             
in the narrowing of the field. According to Ricardo, individuals were essentially fated to follow               
the Iron Law of Wages and live in such a reality. It may not be a virtuous and honorable system                    
but​ ​the​ ​laborers​ ​were​ ​subject​ ​to​ ​it​ ​due​ ​to​ ​circumstances​ ​of​ ​birth.  
Another major contribution to economics is the Ricardian model of trade. Ricardo            
pioneered the concepts of comparative advantage which then formulated his views on trade.             
Looking at two nations which trade with one another, their imports and exports will depend on                
the relative ease of production rather than its value. For instance, even if the United States could                 
produce both cars and corn more efficiently, it could still trade with a country that is less                 
cost-effective in production of cars or corn. It is the relative cost of producing more cars as                 
opposed to more corn that matters. Therefore, just like Smith, Ricardo was a proponent of free                
trade. He argued that trying to produce all the goods necessary for a society will spread the labor                  
and capital of an economy too thin. Specialization is integral for an economy to grow and                
flourish. Thus, Ricardo illustrates the very first notions of opportunity cost in his trade model.               
This foreshadows the emergence of rational cost-benefit analysis. By weighing options of            
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comparative advantage, one can overlook moral and ethical concerns because the opportunity            
cost​ ​ultimately​ ​provides​ ​the​ ​solution. 
John​ ​Stuart​ ​Mill  
The next important figure to consider is John Stuart Mill, who wrote during the middle of                
the 19th century. Mill is still considered a classical economist, drawing heavily on the works of                
Smith and Ricardo, but he is also a link to the upcoming neoclassical movement. Mill starts off                 
The Political Economy ​with a sentiment that closely matches Smith’s. He claims that a              
comprehensive work on economics must include a section on morality (2009). Mill expresses             27
concern for the welfare of society and includes normative claims in his writing. For example, he                
promotes public education and emphasizes the importance of human capital. With a more             
intelligent workforce, society as a whole benefits. Even though this example may seem trivial, it               
demonstrates a new concern for the individual in society. So far, economists have been exploring               
the markets with a macroscopic lens, but Mill peers closer to claim that each individual person                
matters​ ​too.  
Mill further developed the notions of opportunity cost and comparative advantage which            
started with Ricardo. Mill conjured up the notion of reciprocal demand. It showed a new aspect                
of trade, claiming that people in the home nation should care about the income and welfare of                 
individuals living in foreign trading countries. Mill explains that if the origin country exports              
cloth to the destination country, the more income the destination country has the better. They               




will be able to purchase more cloth and thus expand the industry at home. The reciprocal is also                  
true; the destination country wants the origin country to have higher incomes so that they can                
export more to their trading partner. In other words, income is determined by the demand for the                 
exported​ ​good,​ ​which​ ​itself​ ​is​ ​determined​ ​by​ ​the​ ​income​ ​of​ ​consumers​ ​in​ ​the​ ​destination​ ​country.  
The notion of reciprocal demand adds a new dimension to economics. Society now is not               
only concerned with the well-being of citizens in a specific country, but with humanity on a                
global scale. Economic theory has evolved far from Mandeville’s quote about the laborious poor.              
Markets become more successful when people have higher incomes, which in turn stimulates              28
consumption,​ ​and​ ​the​ ​cycle​ ​goes​ ​on.  
The​ ​Marginalists  
The revolutionary change in economics occurred in the late 19th century with a             
movement of writers called the marginalists. Ricardo’s Iron Law of Wages, it turned out, did not                
accurately predict the growth of wages and wealth in an economy. As population increased,              
wages rose with it, and thus national income grew year by year. History proved Ricardo wrong,                
and economic thinkers began searching for new explanations regarding the distribution of wealth             
and the price of labor. The labor theory of value crumbled given the new data on population. The                  
classical view that value was derived from the amount of labor required to produce a commodity                
no longer held. With that crucial argument now obsolete, the future generation of economists              
was​ ​able​ ​to​ ​form​ ​newfound​ ​conjectures​ ​regarding​ ​value​ ​and​ ​wages.  
Carl Menger was one of the first marginalist economists, writing contemporaneously with            
William Jevons and Leon Walras in the 1870s. Menger looks at an economy from a different                
28​ ​de​ ​Mandeville,​ ​B.​ ​(1728). 
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lens. He posits that the “valuing individual” is the most basic unit in a market. This focus on                  
individual consumers leads him to ideas concerning personal preferences. Menger states that            
value is not intrinsic to each good, as previous economists thought (1950). Rather, the value               29
depends on the subjective preferences of each person. Preferences give rise to utility functions              
which map out how much benefit a person receives from consuming or purchasing a particular               
item. Menger arrives at the marginal utility theory as the determinant of value. The theory states                
that value is determined on the margin, meaning that consuming increasing quantities decreases             
the value. For instance, the first bottle of water consumed by a thirsty man will bring him more                  
enjoyment and benefit than the second bottle. Consequently, the second bottle will still be more               
valuable than the third, and so on. Thus, value is determined at the margin, not by any intrinsic                  
properties​ ​or​ ​costs​ ​of​ ​production.  
By refuting the classical economists from the past century, Menger resolves critical            
issues within economics. One significant problem that the obsolete labor theory of value was              
unable to explain was the water-diamond paradox. Water is a resource necessary to our survival,               
yet it’s extremely inexpensive. Diamonds, on the other hand, serve no real purpose other than to                
display someone’s wealth. With so much demand for water, the price should be significantly              
higher than it is in practice. Marginal utility theory is able to reconcile the water-diamond               
paradox because value is not based on grand totalities. People evaluate their choices on the               
margin and do not take into account the entire global supply of water or diamonds. In other                 
words, the benefit from gaining another diamond is drastically greater than the benefit of              





receiving more water. With the abundance of water in society, an additional unit of it is not                 
valued​ ​as​ ​highly.  
Although Menger, Jevons, and Walras all agreed on marginal utility theory, Menger’s            
approach caused a schism in economics. Jevons and Walras were fascinated with the application              
of calculus to economics. They wanted to transform the discipline and bring it closer to               
classification as a science. Hence, they took a more mathematical approach to marginal utility              
theory by graphing utility functions. Menger, on the other hand, disapproved of the progress              
towards a hard science. He refused to see how human beings could be reduced to mere equations.                 
Furthermore, he argued that utility can only be used as an ordinal measure, not a cardinal one. In                  
other words, it is possible to say that a book is valued more than a cup of coffee and create a                     
ranking system, but it is nonsensical to state that a book is worth three times as much as coffee to                    
a certain person. Menger rejects Jevons’ concept of “utils” as measures of utility and therefore               
cannot graph utility functions like the other marginalists. This debate regarding the mathematical             
approach to economics creates a schism between the neoclassicists, like Jevons, and the Austrian              
School​ ​of​ ​Economics,​ ​founded​ ​by​ ​Menger.  
William Jevons firmly believed in the application of mathematics to not only economics             
but all of behavior and human nature. In the introduction to ​The Theory of Political Economy                
Jevons writes, “Now there can be no doubt that pleasure, pain, labour, utility, value, wealth,               
money, capital, etc., are all notions admitting of quantity” (1879, p. 9). He claims that all the                 30
above listed human phenomena can be reduced to a number and therefore an equation. Yet, it is                 
difficult to grasp how emotions and experiences like pleasure or pain can be quantified. This               
30​ ​Jevons,​ ​W.​ ​S.​ ​(1879).​ ​​The​ ​Theory​ ​of​ ​Political​ ​Economy​​ ​(p.​ ​9).  
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further explains why Menger did not support the concept of “utils” as a measure of individual                
welfare. In this regard, Menger makes more sense when he claims that they have ordinal               
rankings but not cardinal ones. Furthermore, Jevons goes on to state that “the whole of our                
actions in industry and trade certainly depend upon comparing quantities of advantage or             
disadvantage” (1879, p.10). This statement alludes to the rationality of the individual in the              31
market. According to Jevons, consumers weigh a number that represents the advantage of             
purchasing a good against a number representing the disadvantage of such an action. Market              
decisions, therefore, can be explained by a mathematical quasi-cost-benefit analysis. In fact,            
Jevons includes mathematical calculations in his book in explaining diminishing marginal utility.            
He boldly asserts that “Pleasure and pain are undoubtedly the ultimate objects of the Calculus of                
Economics,” (1879, p.29) reiterating his stance from the introduction. The emphasis of calculus             32
in economics pushes the field down the path to a greater concern and concentration on rational                
behavior. For the equations put forth by Jevons to work, human behavior must be logical and                
systematic; consumers will maximize their utilities and there is no other alternative. Thus,             
Strathern asserts that Jevons, along with Walras, move economics one step forward in theory, but               
one​ ​step​ ​back​ ​in​ ​terms​ ​of​ ​representation​ ​of​ ​reality​ ​(2001).  33
The​ ​Neoclassical​ ​Economists  
John Bates Clark, a neoclassical economist, further advanced the discipline with his            
theory on wealth distribution. Just as with Smith, looking at the first line of Clark’s text titled                 
The Distribution of Wealth: A Theory of Wages, Interest, and Profits ​provides insight into the               
31​ ​Jevons​ ​(1879)​ ​p.​ ​10 
32​ ​Jevons​ ​(1879)​ ​p.​ ​29 
33 ​ ​​Strathern,​ ​P.​ ​(2001).​ ​​Dr.​ ​Strangelove's​ ​Game:​ ​A​ ​Brief​ ​History​ ​of​ ​Economic​ ​Genius​ ​​(p.219)​.​​ ​Hamish​ ​Hamilton. 
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main focus of the entire work​. Clark writes, “It is the purpose of this work to show that the                   
distribution of the income of society is controlled by a natural law, and that this law, if it worked                   
without friction, would give to every agent of production the amount of wealth which that agent                
creates”(1902, p.1). Clark immediately remarks that economics is governed by natural laws,            34
drawing parallels to scientific fields. He, like other economists at the time, is trying to establish a                 
more concrete system to understanding economics. The use of equations and graphs also             
simplifies the work they have to do. Clark, along with his contemporary economists, is relieved               
that questions of morality and ethics were finally answered by economic models. They no longer               
have to concern themselves with what is the right wage for a particular job. Rather, the solution                 
is​ ​to​ ​pay​ ​people​ ​what​ ​they​ ​were​ ​worth,​ ​which​ ​is​ ​measured​ ​by​ ​their​ ​production.  
As the title clearly suggests, Clark arrives at his conclusions by investigating how income              
is distributed in an economy. He breaks down this hierarchy of income distribution into three               
levels. First, the national income is divided up into various industries, be it wheat, steel, or                
cotton. Afterwards, the income in that particular sector is partitioned to the capitalists, the              
laborers, and the entrepreneurs. Lastly, there are several sub-groups in each of these categories              
because production is split between numerous groups. For example, the income of the wheat              35
industry​ ​has​ ​to​ ​be​ ​allocated​ ​to​ ​the​ ​farmer,​ ​the​ ​miller,​ ​the​ ​baker,​ ​and​ ​so​ ​on.  
Clark claims that in equilibrium “prices are at their natural level when labor and capital in                
one industry produce as much and get as much as they do in any other” (1902, p.19). In this                   36
case, laborers will have no incentive to move from one industry to another. Therefore, natural               
prices cannot be determined by looking only at one industry. The whole economy must be in an                 
34​ ​Clark,​ ​J.​ ​B.​ ​(1902).​ ​​The​ ​Distribution​ ​of​ ​Wealth:​ ​A​ ​Theory​ ​of​ ​Wages,​ ​Interest​ ​and​ ​Profit​ ​​(p.​ ​1)​.​​ ​Macmillan. 
35​ ​Clark​ ​(1902)​​ ​​p.​ ​17 
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equalized state for Clark’s claim to be true. This perspective on the equilibrium condition of the                
economy shapes Clark’s theory of wages. He writes “the specific productivity of labor fixes              
wages” (1902, p.35) meaning that wages are determined by the value of the product. In               37
essence, Clark posits that laborers are paid what they are worth, and they are worth what they                 
produce.  
The transition to neoclassical economics can mainly be attributed to Alfred Marshall, the             
economist who was able to reconcile both demand and supply side economics. Marshall became              
fascinated by economics after reading Mill’s work which emphasized the role of morality in              
economics. Marshall’s drive included combatting poverty using sophisticated economic         
modelling. Strathern remarks that Marshall had two conflicting forces in his life- the first being               
his passion for mathematics and the second an extremely positive view of Christian virtues              
except for faith itself. Writing in the 1890s, he combined demand and supply side economics               38
by claiming that price is determined by the intersection of a demand and supply curve. Both were                 
required to derive the price of a good. Furthermore, Marshall introduced the idea of partial               
equilibrium analysis. This method allowed for economists to investigate issues on a wide range              
of scales, from analyzing an entire country to just one industry and even a single individual in the                  
market.  
Marshall was revolutionary in that he was able to apply his theories broadly in economics               
theory. However, his partial equilibrium analysis posed a problem. In fact, it was a critical issue                
that was starting to puzzle many economists at the time. As the discipline grew and became more                 
understandable, more variables were used to explain economic phenomena. There was more to             
37​ ​Clark​ ​(1902)​ ​p.​ ​35 
38​ ​Strathern.​ ​(2001)​ ​p.​ ​222 
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the market than just price, wages, and rent. Now the field had to tackle marginal product,                
marginal utility, individual demand, and many additional factors. Thus, Marshall coined the term             
ceteris paribus in economics meaning “all else being equal.” In order for the equations and               
calculations to work, economists could not account for all the wide-ranging variables pertinent to              
the problem. Instead, they propose that all the other variables outside the scope of the analysis                
were constant and in a static state in order to simplify the necessary calculations. This seems like                 
a rather myopic solution as a market relies on several variables and impacts a myriad of others; a                  
change in one value influences a list of other unknowns. Accuracy was sacrificed for precision in                
economic​ ​models.  
Marshall brought economics even further into the abstract by adding the dimension of             
time to his analysis of supply and demand. He posits that in the short run, demand (i.e individual                  
preferences) dictates where prices will settle. Supply is fixed in the short run, so price is solely                 
determined by the demand function. This supports the views of the neoclassicals and their focus               
on demand side economics. However, in the long run, price is restricted by variables such as cost                 
of production and wages. Therefore, a change in demand will only result in a change of quantity                 
produced, not price. The long run graph aligns with the beliefs held by the classical economists.                
Marshall brought both demand side and supply side economics together, appeasing everyone.            
Between the long run and short run, there was an intermediary graph, Marshall claimed. Here,               
both supply and demand functions were necessary to determine price and quantity. This is the               
Marshallian cross that most people now associate with the common supply and demand graph.              
Strathern argues that as economics was being more universally applied in the real world, it was                
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becoming more of an academic field that explores the theoretical realm, rather than that of the                
world​ ​at​ ​large.   39
The rise of neoclassical economics can also be attributed to the decreasing influence of              
moral philosophy on economics. The downfall of the labor theory of value meant a redefinition               
of wages and how they are distributed. Subsistence level wages emphasized by Ricardo’s Iron              
Law of Wages fell apart with no historical evidence or support. The marginalists discovered the               
solution to the issue with paying fair wages. Namely, wage is determined by marginal product.               
Moral considerations are not pertinent anymore because the neoclassicists have formulated a            
series of simple equations. The origins of this mathematical approach can be traced to this time                
period​ ​which​ ​has​ ​since​ ​shaped​ ​the​ ​path​ ​of​ ​economics​ ​to​ ​its​ ​modern,​ ​impersonal​ ​state.  
Opposition​ ​to​ ​Neoclassicism  
Knut Wicksell saw economics heading in the wrong direction, with its focus on abstract              
theory, and wanted to right its path. Interestingly, he did not fault capitalism or neoclassicism               
itself for the troubling developments in the field. Instead, he claims that the neoclassical writers               
themselves were to blame for their shortsighted viewpoints on economic issues. Wicksell argues             
that too many economic writers are cloistered in universities and academia, far away from the               
real issues plaguing urban centers. Ironically, Wicksell further developed ideas that pushed            40
economics into the abstract realm in his book, ​Interest and Prices ​(1898). He set forth the                
necessary conditions for marginal product of labor and capital to sum up to gross domestic               
product. He claimed that perfect competition and constant returns to scale were a requirement for               
39​ ​Strathern.​ ​(2001)​ ​p.​ ​227 
40​ ​Pressman,​ ​S.​ ​(2013).​ ​​Fifty​ ​Major​ ​Economists​ ​​(p.119).​ ​Routledge. 
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the calculations to work out. Yet, these components are highly theoretical and very rarely              
representative​ ​of​ ​real​ ​world​ ​markets.  
Similarly, Thorstein Veblen, one of Wicksell’s contemporaries, held a negative view           
regarding the recent developments in economics. Veblen disagreed with the rational,           
self-interested economic agent at the foundation of neoclassical models. Instead, he argued that             
humans are motivated by psychosocial phenomena such as fear, culture, and conformity. One             41
of his major works, ​The Theory of the Leisure Class​, asserts that the wealthy class considers                
itself vastly superior to the working class, even in a biological sense. In fact, Veblen writes that                 
this phenomenon is not new to society; it can be traced back to civilizations including the                
Vikings in the Middle Ages and Polynesian tribes in the Stone Age. Furthermore, the elite have a                 
strong urge to differentiate themselves from the lower classes. This is reminiscent of Smith’s              
claim that “The rich man glories in his riches because he feels that they naturally draw upon him                  
the attention of the world” (2010, p.50). The urge to purchase goods in order to impress others                 42
brings forth a new component to preferences. Consumers not only purchased goods to maximize              
utility based on how much benefit they would receive from the product, they also took into                
account sociological implications. He states, “with the exception of the instinct of            
self-preservation, the propensity for emulation is probably the strongest and most alert and             
persistent of economic motives proper” (1899, p.110). This rings true even in today’s society              43
and is demonstrated by the need to have the newest device on the market. Veblen criticized the                 
neoclassical approach of a rational, maximizing agent because there are these social factors at              
play​ ​as​ ​well.  
41​ ​Strathern.​ ​(2001)​ ​p.​ ​235 
42​ ​Smith.​ ​TMS.​ ​(2010)​ ​p.​ ​50 
43​ ​Veblen,​ ​T.​ ​(2005).​ ​​The​ ​Theory​ ​Of​ ​The​ ​Leisure​ ​Class;​ ​An​ ​Economic​ ​Study​ ​Of​ ​Institutions​ ​​(p.​ ​110).​ ​Aakar​ ​Books. 
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Veblen continues to critique the current economic stance on business in his other book,              
The Theory of Business Enterprises​. Veblen claims that businessmen are far from altruistic and              
do not wish to allocate resources as efficiently as possible- a sentiment apparent to most people                
besides economists. He states “efforts are directed, not to maintaining the permanent efficiency             
of the industrial equipment, but to influencing the tone of the market for the time being, the                 
apprehensions of other large operators, or the transient faith of investors” (1904, p.10). In other               44
words, managers are not solely interested in increasing the efficiency of the production line.              
Rather, their aspirations lie in gaining market power and deterring competitors from entering the              
market. Writing during the time of the rise of such monopolies as Rockefeller’s Standard Oil,               
Veblen believed that efficiency and productivity were not the goal of enterprise. Profit, at the               
expense​ ​of​ ​workers​ ​and​ ​other​ ​firms,​ ​was​ ​the​ ​true​ ​purpose​ ​of​ ​industry.  
The rational economic agent model arose out of the marginalist revolution and became             
cemented in the discipline by neoclassical economics. However, at every turn the concept of              
perfectly rational behavior faced opposition. Wicksell grew worried that economics was straying            
from reality and concentrating too much on the theoretical. Veblen shared some sentiments with              
Smith but held a more pessimistic view of humanity. Where Smith argued that society must be                
grounded in a moral and just system, else businesses would lose customers for their unfair               
practices, Veblen saw that the status quo contradicted Smith’s optimism. Corporations were            
growing larger and held more power than ever before. Instead of converging towards equilibrium              




where price would settle to the marginal cost of production, monopolies were reaping massive              
profits​ ​by​ ​maintaining​ ​artificially​ ​high​ ​prices.  
Despite the historical events that challenged the reigning economic assumptions,          
neoclassical economics moved forward. Bank runs in the late 19th century, the rise of              
monopolies and industry barons, and then the Great Depression provided people with a negative              
image of economics. Economists truly were becoming more and more removed from the real              
world​ ​as​ ​the​ ​discipline​ ​became​ ​an​ ​academic​ ​powerhouse.  
John​ ​von​ ​Neumann​ ​and​ ​Oskar​ ​Morgenstern 
The pinnacle of theoretical economics is game theory. Formulated by John von Neumann             
and Oskar Morgenstern in the 1940s, game theory attempts to reduce all economic activity to               
mathematical calculations. Von Neumann did not start his career in economics. Initially, his             
intellect drew him to chemistry and mathematics. Even in those fields, he took a heavily               
mathematical approach to developing groundbreaking theories. His accomplishments in quantum          
theory and mathematics, however, were overshadowed by other scientists and it was only             
afterwards that von Neumann was introduced to economics by fellow Hungarian colleague            
Nicholas Kaldor. He began his investigation of the field with Walras’s ​Elements of Pure              
Economics and immediately criticized the theories he found within. Ironically, von Neumann             
challenged the technical view of markets and equilibrium. According to him, the markets did not               
move because the unemployment rate, for instance, mediated other variables. Rather, it was the              
participation of human actors in the market that influenced its movement and led to fluctuations               
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and equilibrium. It was this fascination about how individuals interact with one another that led               
to​ ​the​ ​development​ ​of​ ​game​ ​theory.  
One of the first fundamental components of game theory was the minimax theorem. Von              
Neumann asserted that this notion would provide actors with the best strategy to choose in               
practically any setting. According to the minimax theorem, actors should analyze the maximum             
possible loss to each possible strategy available to them. The optimal strategy, therefore, is the               
one that minimizes the maximum possible loss. Thus, von Neumann’s theorem was less about              
winning​ ​in​ ​all​ ​scenarios​ ​and​ ​more​ ​about​ ​avoiding​ ​losses.  
Further developments in game theory were made possible with the collaboration of von             
Neumann and Morgenstern starting in 1939. Morgenstern was ambitious and wished to            
formulate a theory “in the truly scientific spirit” (Nasar, 2011, p. 85). Both Morgenstern and               45
von Neumann shared the belief that economics was not scientific enough as a discipline. This               
was not to say that all of economic theory was incorrect. Instead, they claimed that the field                 
merely explained market phenomena without describing the mechanisms operating behind the           
scenes. Their drive pushed them to define a set of axioms that would establish the theoretical                
framework for the rest of economics. Their wishes came true as game theory became the               
cornerstone of economics and rational thinking became the dominant view in the discipline. Von              
Neumann wholeheartedly believed that his theories would explain and perfectly predict human            
behavior in the market. In fact, his biographer writes, “If the von-Neumann Morgenstern belief              
were indeed justified… the problem of wise choice and rational action would be reduced to a                
matter​ ​of​ ​calculation”​ ​(Heims,​ ​1982,​ ​p.​ ​293).   46
45​ ​Nasar,​ ​S.​ ​(2011).​ ​​A​ ​Beautiful​ ​Mind​​ ​(p.85).​ ​Simon​ ​and​ ​Schuster. 
46​ ​Heims,​ ​S.​ ​J.,​ ​&​ ​Bailey,​ ​D.​ ​W.​ ​(1982).​ ​John​ ​von​ ​Neumann​ ​and​ ​Norbert​ ​Wiener,​ ​from​ ​Mathematics​ ​to​ ​the 
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The four axioms von Neumann and Morgenstern settled on were completeness,           
transitivity, independence, and continuity. Completeness signifies that for every option ​x ​and ​y              
either ​x is weakly preferred to ​y or ​y is weakly preferred to ​x​. Transitivity applies the same                  
principle as the transitive property of mathematics; if ​x ​is weakly preferred to ​y and ​y is weakly                  
to ​z then ​x is weakly preferred to ​z​. The continuity axiom explains how probabilities of a set of                   
choices must add up to one and there exists a point where an agent is indifferent between the                  
middle option and the combination of optimal choice and the least optimal choice. Lastly, the               47
independence property of expected utility theory states that when the choice between two options              
has identical components, the agent can isolate those and only consider the pertinent and unique               
prospects. Moreover, game theory claims that economic agents are mutually rational and have             
mutually consistent beliefs. In other words, individuals are aware that other players will act              
rationally,​ ​and​ ​they​ ​believe​ ​that​ ​they​ ​are​ ​correct​ ​about​ ​the​ ​actions​ ​of​ ​the​ ​other​ ​players.  
With the major, 600-page work, ​Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, ​published in             
1944, the two authors now turned to showing its wide applicability in the real world. Von                
Neumann, in particular, showed interest in international affairs. Combined with his past            
experience in chemistry and quantum physics, he found himself appointed to the Atomic Energy              
Commission in the midst of the Cold War. Von Neumann actually advocated for striking the               
USSR before they had a chance to act, which was the optimal option according to game theory.                 
However, the payoff matrix of a nuclear war with the Soviet Union was dramatically simplified               
and could not possibly account for all the variables relevant to the issue. Thus, game theory                
presents an oversimplified view of extremely complex human behaviors. The assumption of            
47​ ​For​ ​all​ ​P,​ ​Q,​ ​R,​ ​in​ ​Δ​ ​with​ ​P>Q>R,​ ​there​ ​exists​ ​𝛼∊​ ​(0,1)​ ​such​ ​that​ ​𝛼P​ ​+​ ​(1-𝛼)R​ ​~​ ​Q.  
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mutual rationality and mutual consistency greatly exaggerates the accuracy with which people            
reason. Von Neumann’s stance on issues regarding international relations and his insistence on             
applying game theory to all aspects of life led one psychologist to remark that von Neumann was                 
losing​ ​aspects​ ​of​ ​his​ ​consciousness​ ​and​ ​forgetting​ ​what​ ​it​ ​meant​ ​to​ ​be​ ​human.  48
Game theory built on the push for economics as a hard science which has its roots in the                  
marginal revolution in the 1870s. The neoclassical school insisted on developing mathematical            
models to explain economic phenomena and human behavior in the market. It was not until game                
theory that this goal was realized. Von Neumann and Morgenstern wrote an extensive             
description of the social interactions that drive market fluctuations and believed that they             
accurately modelled decision-making. Yet, the rigid framework and concrete assumptions at the            
core of game theory were unable to account for many behaviors and actions observed in reality.                
Perhaps it illustrated a highly extensive normative model of how agents should act in a market,                








48​ ​Strathern.​ ​(2001)​ ​p.​ ​284 
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Chapter​ ​Two:​ ​Behavioral​ ​Economic​ ​Research 
 
The notion of rationality in economics implies that individuals use all available and             
relevant information they possess in order to evaluate a choice and then make a decision.               
Behavioral economics research challenges this information processing method due to its           
inefficiency. Simon (1955) was one of the first economists to develop a formal theory of               
decision-making that directly counters the rational agent model in economics. He claimed that             49
there are restrictions to rational decision-making in the form of time constraints, cognitive load,              
and the importance of the decision itself. Simon’s model suggests that individuals do not always               
maximize their own utility. Rather, they find a satisfactory solution or choice that is good enough                
and​ ​do​ ​not​ ​go​ ​through​ ​intensive​ ​mental​ ​reasoning.  
Expected​ ​Utility​ ​Theory 
One model at the cornerstone of economics is expected utility theory, which illustrates             
how a rational agent makes decisions under risk or uncertainty. Since the model deals with risk,                
it lies at the foundation of economics as it can be applied to insurance, investing, retirement                
funds, and a myriad of uncertain prospects. The origins of expected utility theory can be found in                 
Bernoulli’s work in the 18th century, but the theory was not formalized until 1944 with the                
collaboration of von Neumann and Morgenstern. Expected utility theory actually arose during            50
their​ ​formulation​ ​of​ ​game​ ​theory,​ ​and​ ​the​ ​two​ ​rely​ ​on​ ​one​ ​another.  
49​ ​Simon,​ ​H.​ ​A.​ ​(1955).​ ​A​ ​Behavioral​ ​Model​ ​Of​ ​Rational​ ​Choice.​ ​​The​ ​Quarterly​ ​Journal​ ​Of​ ​Economics​,​ ​​69​(1), 
99-118. 




Expected utility theory assumes that people’s preferences are continuous, complete,          
transitive, and independent. Additionally, it assumes stable preferences across time and under            
risk. The theory evaluates choices by multiplying the utility of a gamble by the probability of it                 
occurring. According to expected utility theory, rational agents choose between two prospects by             
maximizing​ ​utility​ ​using​ ​the​ ​following​ ​function​ ​EU=​ ​u(x)p​ ​+​ ​u(y)q.   51
One of the main tenets of expected utility theory is that choices are evaluated based on                
final states. In essence, the model claims that people choose between outcomes and which one               
will make them better off. This seems accurate and intuitive when interpreting risk in the positive                
domain. However, a potential loss in wealth is perceived differently from an equivalent, possible              
gain. The idea that final states are not the critical factor in decision making should not seem                 
far-fetched to economists. The marginalist revolution in the 1870s demonstrated that consumers            
make decisions on the margin. Moreover, valuation of a good is based on its marginal benefit                
rather than its global supply and scarcity. Nevertheless, expected utility theory relies on final              
states​ ​as​ ​determinants​ ​of​ ​decision​ ​making.  
Expected utility did not go unchallenged for long. One of the first examples of its               
downfall is the Allais paradox (1953). The paradox illustrates a clear violation of expected              52
utility theory, particularly the independence axiom. The following two sets of prospects are taken              
from Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) example of the Allais paradox. First, choose between two              
gambles. Gamble A is $2,500 with a probability of 33%, $2,400 with probability 66%, or $0                
with probability 1%. Gamble B is $2,400 for sure. The second set goes as follows. Gamble C is                  
$2,500 with a 33% chance or $0 with a 67% chance. Gamble D is $2,400 with 34% chance and                   
51​ ​Rubinstein,​ ​A.​ ​(2012).​ ​​Lecture​ ​Notes​ ​In​ ​Microeconomic​ ​Theory:​ ​The​ ​Economic​ ​Agent​.​ ​Princeton​ ​University​ ​Press. 
52​ ​Allais,​ ​M.​ ​(1953).​ ​La​ ​Psychologie​ ​De​ ​L'homme​ ​Rationnel​ ​Devant​ ​Le​ ​Risque:​ ​La​ ​Theorie​ ​et​ ​L'experience.​ ​ ​Journal 
De​ ​La​ ​Societe​ ​De​ ​Statistique​ ​De​ ​Paris,​ ​94​,​ ​47-73. 
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$0 with 66%. The choice sets are summarized in a table below. During research studies,               
participants chose Gamble B 82% of the time and Gamble C 83% of the time. The results                 
regarding gamble B imply the following utility function: u(2,400) > .33u(2,500) + .66u(2,400)             
which simplifies to .34(2,400) > .33(2,500). Thus far, an agent can still exhibit such preferences               
without any red flags. However, for participants to also prefer Gamble C over Gamble D               
presents an issue. That choice implies the following utility function: .33u(2,500) > .34u(2,400).             
This is the reverse inequality from the previous choice set. Rational agents are supposed to have                
stable preferences, but the Allais paradox demonstrates that is not always the case. Moreover, the               
independence axiom states that a rational decision-maker will isolate identical choices, cancel            
them​ ​out,​ ​and​ ​make​ ​a​ ​choice​ ​based​ ​on​ ​preferences​ ​over​ ​the​ ​unique​ ​components. 
 
Gamble​ ​A  $2,500​ ​w/​ ​33%​ ​chance 
$2,400​ ​w/​ ​66% 
$0​ ​w/​ ​1%​ ​chance 
Gamble​ ​C $2,500​ ​w/​ ​33%​ ​chance 
$0​ ​w/​ ​67%​ ​chance 
Gamble​ ​B $2,400​ ​for​ ​sure Gamble​ ​D $2,400​ ​w/​ ​34%​ ​chance 
$0​ ​w/​ ​66%​ ​chance 
 
Heuristics 
Although the Allais paradox was discovered in 1953, it was considered to be just an               
anomaly. It pointed to a trivial flaw in expected utility theory, and in no way did it undermine its                   
reputation or presence in economics. Allais may have been the first to formally describe a flaw in                 
expected utility theory, but he was certainly not the last to conduct research in that area.                
Kahneman and Tversky (1974) investigated heuristics to find several more instances in which             
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individuals violate the model. They were able to demonstrate that people use cognitive shortcuts              
to answer questions and make decisions. The three major heuristics that receive the most              
scholarly​ ​attention​ ​are​ ​availability,​ ​representativeness,​ ​and​ ​anchoring.  
The anchoring effect occurs when individuals “consider a particular value for an            
unknown quantity before estimating that quantity” (Kahneman, 2011, p. 119). Anchoring is a             53
powerful psychological phenomenon because even irrelevant anchors are able to influence           
estimates. For instance, after spinning a rigged wheel of fortune, participants’ estimates of the              
percentage of African countries in the UN corresponded to the low or high anchor they had just                 
seen (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). The number from the wheel has nothing to do with the                54
quantity of African nations in the UN. Nevertheless, a low anchor correlated with a low estimate                
and a high anchor with a high estimate. Therefore, anchoring already presents a violation of the                
assumption of rational decision making. People are using extraneous information in their            
reasoning,​ ​letting​ ​uninformative​ ​anchors​ ​impact​ ​their​ ​judgments.  
Further research on the anchoring effect provided the necessary conditions for anchoring            
to occur. Taking the side of the rational agent, if the experimenter warned participants about the                
presence and effect of an anchor, a rational decision maker should be able to discount the                
influence of the anchor and adjust the estimate. However, both Wilson et al. (1996) and               55
Quattrone et al. (1981) demonstrate that revealing the anchor to participants and making them              56
53​ ​Kahneman,​ ​D.​ ​(2011).​ ​​Thinking,​ ​Fast​ ​And​ ​Slow​.​ ​(p.119).​ ​Macmillan. 
54​ ​Tversky,​ ​A.,​ ​&​ ​Kahneman,​ ​D.​ ​(1975).​ ​Judgment​ ​Under​ ​Uncertainty:​ ​Heuristics​ ​And​ ​Biases.​ ​In​ ​​Utility,​ ​Probability, 
And​ ​Human​ ​Decision​ ​Making​​ ​(p.​ ​141-162).​ ​Springer​ ​Netherlands. 
55​ ​Wilson,​ ​T.​ ​D.,​ ​Houston,​ ​C.​ ​E.,​ ​Etling,​ ​K.​ ​M.,​ ​&​ ​Brekke,​ ​N.​ ​(1996).​ ​A​ ​New​ ​Look​ ​At​ ​Anchoring​ ​Effects:​ ​Basic 
Anchoring​ ​And​ ​Its​ ​Antecedents.​ ​​Journal​ ​of​ ​Experimental​ ​Psychology:​ ​General​,​ ​​125​(4),​ ​387. 
56​ ​​Quattrone,​ ​G.A.,​ ​Lawrence,​ ​C.P.,​ ​Finkel,​ ​S.E.,​ ​&​ ​Andrus,​ ​D.C.​ ​(1981).​ ​Explorations​ ​In​ ​Anchoring:​ ​The​ ​Effects​ ​Of 
Prior​ ​Range,​ ​Anchor​ ​Extremity,​ ​And​ ​Suggestive​ ​Hints.​ ​In​ ​Gilovich,​ ​T.,​ ​Griffin,​ ​D.,​ ​&​ ​Kahneman,​ ​D.​ ​(2002). 
Heuristics​ ​And​ ​Biases:​ ​The​ ​Psychology​ ​of​ ​Intuitive​ ​Judgment​.​ ​Cambridge​ ​University​ ​Press. 
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aware of its impact did little to diminish its effect. In fact, even when participants reported that                 
they were not influenced by the anchor, the effect was still present. Evidently, conscious              
awareness of the anchor did not mitigate it, suggesting that there is an unconscious mechanism at                
play.  
Similarly, monetary incentives did not reduce the size of the anchoring effect.            
Economists argue that incentives motivate people to be more careful with their judgments and              
increase the importance placed on the decision. Experimental data show that providing            
participants with cash prizes for accurate estimates did not decrease the anchoring effect,             
although it did reduce the participants’ ratings of the anchor’s influence. This finding further              
supports the notion that individuals struggle to properly adjust their estimates. Being aware of an               
anchor and trying to reduce its influence can backfire and simply diminish the perception of the                
anchor itself. Therefore, incentives may have had a neutral, if not converse, effect on reasoning.               
The participants falsely believed that they had discounted the anchor when in fact they had not,                
resulting​ ​in​ ​an​ ​insufficient​ ​adjustment.  
Anchoring resembles other psychological phenomena and biases. Chapman and Johnson          
(2002) categorize it as a type of confirmation bias. The individual considers how the anchor is                57
similar to the target quantity but fails to recognize how different the two quantities are.               
Anchoring is classified as a priming and attentional mechanism as well. A comparative judgment              
is not necessary for the anchoring effect to occur. As long as the anchor becomes salient through                 
significant processing, it will influence a later judgment (Wilson et al., 1996). Hence, anchoring              58
is considered an attentional heuristic that leads to an associative error. Furthermore, some             
57​ ​Chapman,​ ​G.​ ​B.,​ ​&​ ​Johnson,​ ​E.​ ​J.​ ​(2002).​ ​Incorporating​ ​The​ ​Irrelevant:​ ​Anchors​ ​In​ ​Judgments​ ​Of​ ​Belief​ ​And 
Value.​ ​​Heuristics​ ​And​ ​Biases:​ ​The​ ​Psychology​ ​Of​ ​Intuitive​ ​Judgment​,​ ​120-138. 
58​ ​​ ​Wilson,​ ​et​ ​al.,​ ​(1996).  
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researchers argue that anchoring takes place in the information retrieval stage of information             
processing. In particular, the anchor makes similar and nearby numbers more readily available             
for​ ​recollection.​ ​Therefore,​ ​anchoring​ ​may​ ​be​ ​related​ ​to​ ​the​ ​availability​ ​heuristic.  
Sherman et al. define cognitive availability as “the ease with which this outcome can be               
pictured or constructed. The more available an outcome is, the more likely it is perceived to be”                 
(1985, pg. 118). In other words, after imagining a scenario it becomes subjectively more likely               59
to happen. Consequently, a situation that is easier to imagine should yield a higher probability               
than a difficult to imagine one. Sherman and his colleagues ran an experiment to uncover               
whether that hypothesis is true. Half of the participants read about a disease that was prevalent                
among college students in Arizona while the other half read the same information but also had to                 
imagine contracting the illness and experiencing the symptoms for three weeks. Furthermore,            
each group was split in half again, with one half given symptoms that were easy to imagine,                 
typical and specific symptoms, whereas the other half read about ambiguous, harder to imagine              
symptoms. The results confirmed the hypothesis; the participants who had to imagine the             
unambiguous symptoms rated themselves more likely to contract the disease than the participants             
who​ ​had​ ​the​ ​difficult-to-imagine​ ​symptoms.  
The availability heuristic acts as a cognitive shortcut that undermines the rationality of             
decision making. Kahneman explains heuristics by stating that the question at hand is replaced              
by a simpler question and only then is an answer produced. In the case of the availability                 
heuristic, a question asking about the probability of a situation is replaced by the question- how                
59​ ​Sherman,​ ​S.​ ​J.,​ ​Cialdini,​ ​R.​ ​B.,​ ​Schwartzman,​ ​D.​ ​F.,​ ​&​ ​Reynolds,​ ​K.​ ​D.​ ​(1985).​ ​Imagining​ ​Can​ ​Heighten​ ​Or 
Lower​ ​The​ ​Perceived​ ​Likelihood​ ​Of​ ​Contracting​ ​A​ ​Disease:​ ​The​ ​Mediating​ ​Effect​ ​Of​ ​Ease​ ​Of​ ​Imagery.​ ​​Personality 
And​ ​Social​ ​Psychology​ ​Bulletin​,​ ​​11​(1),​ ​118-127. 
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easily can I come up with examples of this scenario? A rational agent would not be influenced by                  
the​ ​effect​ ​of​ ​availability​ ​and​ ​ease​ ​of​ ​recollection.  
The source of the availability heuristic may stem from two distinct mental processes.             
Schwarz and Vaughn (2002) want to distinguish ease of recall from content of recall in order to                 
better understand the cognitive shortcut. In essence, when making a judgment is it the relative               60
ease of recalling relevant information that shapes a judgment or the actual content generated              
through accessing memory? To test for these effects, Wanke et al. (1995) ran an experiment               61
similar to Kahneman and Tversky’s (1973) first availability heuristic research experiment.           62
They asked participants to write down ten words beginning with the letter ​t ​and ten words with ​t                  
as the third letter. The new condition that Wanke and colleagues added was a sheet of paper with                  
the letter ​t as a watermark running all across the page. One group was told that the watermark                   
would ease the recollection of words beginning with ​t ​(facilitating condition) and another was              
told that the sheet of paper would hinder their ability to recall those words (inhibiting condition).                
The results demonstrate that the participants in the facilitating condition adjusted their judgments             
to claim that there are more words with the letter ​t in the third position than words that begin                    
with ​t. ​Conversely, those in the inhibiting condition, judged words that begin with ​t as more                 
common. The experiment identifies that ease of recall is the primary source of the availability               
heuristic. Individuals adjust their judgments if they are aware that an external force is influencing               
their​ ​decision,​ ​yet​ ​they​ ​end​ ​up​ ​distorting​ ​their​ ​estimate​ ​in​ ​either​ ​case.  
60​ ​Schwarz,​ ​N.,​ ​&​ ​Vaughn,​ ​L.​ ​A.​ ​(2002).​ ​The​ ​availability​ ​heuristic​ ​revisited:​ ​Ease​ ​of​ ​recall​ ​and​ ​content​ ​of​ ​recall​ ​as 
distinct​ ​sources​ ​of​ ​information. 
61​ ​Wänke,​ ​M.,​ ​Schwarz,​ ​N.,​ ​&​ ​Bless,​ ​H.​ ​(1995).​ ​The​ ​Availability​ ​Heuristic​ ​Revisited:​ ​Experienced​ ​Ease​ ​Of​ ​Retrieval 
In​ ​Mundane​ ​Frequency​ ​Estimates.​ ​​Acta​ ​Psychologica​,​ ​​89​(1),​ ​83-90. 
62​ ​Tversky,​ ​A.,​ ​&​ ​Kahneman,​ ​D.​ ​(1973).​ ​Availability:​ ​A​ ​heuristic​ ​for​ ​judging​ ​frequency​ ​and​ ​probability.​ ​​Cognitive 
psychology​,​ ​​5​(2),​ ​207-232. 
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The final, major heuristic identified by Kahneman and Tversky is representativeness.           
They define the phenomenon as “an assessment of the degree of correspondence between a              
sample and a population, an instance and a category, … between an outcome and a model”                
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1983, pg. 296). The representativeness heuristic replaces a question            63
involving probability with a question regarding similarity. Representativeness leads to a           
significant but seemingly easily avoidable miscalculation called the conjunction error. The           
mistake refers to a judgment which places a higher probability on ​A&B ​happening than on just ​A.                 
Even though the first set is contained within the second, people frequently fall into the trap of                 
representativeness​ ​and​ ​assign​ ​too​ ​high​ ​a​ ​probability​ ​to​ ​​A&B.  
Kahneman and Tversky’s (1982) classic example provides participants with a description           
of two fictional individuals, Bill and Linda, and then asks them to rate how each character                
resembles a certain occupation. The findings indicate that people rate Linda as more likely to “be                
a bank teller and active in the feminist movement” than “to be a bank teller.” Surely, the profile                  
of Linda given to participants lends itself to imagining a woman active in the feminist               
movement, but the questionnaire asked about the probability of her belonging to various groups              
and occupations. This illustrates how the question of probability is replaced by a question of               
similarity.  
Thus far, the conjunction error seems trivial because the experimental setting was            
constructed to exploit the cognitive bias. However, the mistaken judgment also extends to other              
populations, including medical experts, which is more concerning. After reading about the            
symptoms of a particular patient, practicing physicians judged the likelihood of certain ailments.             
63​ ​Tversky,​ ​A.,​ ​&​ ​Kahneman,​ ​D.​ ​(1983).​ ​Extensional​ ​Versus​ ​Intuitive​ ​Reasoning:​ ​The​ ​Conjunction​ ​Fallacy​ ​In 
Probability​ ​Judgment.​ ​​Psychological​ ​Review​,​ ​​90​(4),​ ​293-315. 
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The results indicate that every time, the combination of an unrepresentative disease with a              
probable one was judged as more likely than just the unrepresentative illness. On average, 91%               
of​ ​medical​ ​professionals​ ​fell​ ​prey​ ​to​ ​the​ ​conjunction​ ​error.  
Representativeness and the conjunction error can be found universally; a simple           
reasoning error that is quite pervasive. When confronted with the apparent trap of conjunction,              
most participants recognize their miscalculation and understand their mistake. In some instances,            
however, like in the case of the Linda example, participants still struggle to properly apply               
probability. It appears that people are not as sophisticated in statistical reasoning as they think               
they are. Most fail to recognize nested scenarios. In order to fully comprehend probability,              
people​ ​need​ ​to​ ​know​ ​when​ ​to​ ​apply​ ​it​ ​and​ ​when​ ​other​ ​information​ ​should​ ​take​ ​precedent.  
The three major heuristics uncovered by Kahneman and Tversky can no longer be             
considered mere anomalies. The experiments demonstrate systematic departures from perfectly          
rational reasoning. Such cognitive biases violate the principle of rational thinking by illustrating             
that people utilize mental shortcuts to more efficiently process information. Rational thought            
implies using all available and relevant information to form a judgment or make a decision.               
Conversely, heuristic research shows that irrelevant information can influence our judgments,           
referring to anchoring, and some information tends to be overlooked. In other instances,             
however, information can be given too much weight, as seen in the studies on the availability                
heuristic. Furthermore, a rational actor is believed to have a strong and comprehensive             
understanding of statistics and probability. Yet, the presence of the conjunction error, even in              
decisions made by experts, indicates a lack of complete knowledge of probability. In general,              
decisions are not made independently, they exist in relation to other decisions and are influenced               
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by weighted pieces of information. The rigid axiomatic structure of game theory lacks the              
flexibility​ ​to​ ​accurately​ ​predict​ ​decision-making​ ​in​ ​these​ ​contexts. 
The aforementioned research paints heuristics in a predominantly negative light, by           
implying that these phenomena trick our minds into making inaccurate judgments. However,            
heuristics arose for a reason. They are cognitive shortcuts that allow for more efficient reasoning.               
In the aggregate, heuristics will result in a generally accurate estimate or judgment. The              
experiments presented above are designed to exploit and emphasize the effect of heuristics which              
are used in everyday lives. Overall, these cognitive processes reduce cognitive load and allow              
our attentional mechanisms to remain alert and not overworked. Nevertheless, the rigid            
foundation of rational thinking in economics does not account for these heuristics, and they              
present​ ​a​ ​challenge​ ​to​ ​the​ ​models​ ​that​ ​rely​ ​on​ ​perfect​ ​rationality.  
Prospect​ ​Theory 
In 1979, Kahneman and Tversky introduced an alternate to expected utility theory called             
prospect theory. Prospect theory is able to account for the departures from perfect rationality and               
stable preferences. The theory puts forth a formula to evaluate two choices under risk. It asserts                
that an individual will choose a prospect to maximize utility where V= v(x)π(p) + v(y)π(q). In                
this equation, ​v is a value function, ​x ​and ​y are the prospects, ​p ​and ​q ​are the probabilities of                      
receiving ​x ​and ​y ​respectively, and π is a function that weighs the probability. The major change                 
in this formula compared to expected utility theory is the weighting of probability. Prospect              
theory posits that individuals overweight low probabilities and underweight high probabilities.           
Thus, probability is not a linear function in people’s minds. Rather, it depends on subjective               
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perceptions. Individuals place decision weights on probabilities that distort their magnitudes.           
This effect is particularly powerful at the tail ends of the distribution. Gonzalez and Wu (1999)                
show that participants regard a prospect of a 5% chance of $100 as being worth $10, in which                  
case they overweight the low 5% chance. Moreover, people judged a 90% chance of $100 as                64
being​ ​equivalent​ ​to​ ​$63,​ ​indicating​ ​an​ ​underweighting​ ​of​ ​high​ ​probabilities.  
The four crucial features of prospect theory are reference dependence, loss aversion,            
diminishing sensitivity, and probability weighting as mentioned above. Reference dependence          
directly counters expected utility theory’s reliance on final states. Prospect theory emphasizes the             
importance of relative gains and losses, in other words, the change from a reference point.               
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) defend this point by stating that the perceptual mechanisms in              
our brains work on a similar basis. Namely, perception is a judgment made in conjunction with                
an experience of the past. For instance, our experience of temperature is based on relative               
changes. In one study, participants were asked to immerse one hand in a bowl of frigid water and                  
the other hand in a bowl of hot water for one minute. Afterwards, they placed both hands into a                   
bowl with room temperature water and asked to judge how each hand felt. The hand from the                 
cold water experienced warmth whereas the hand from the hot bowl felt cold (Kahneman et al.,                
1993).   65
Similarly, consider the following scenario presented by Kahneman (2003) : Two people            
receive a report from their investment broker. The first individual, ​A, learns that their wealth               66
64​ ​Gonzalez,​ ​R.,​ ​&​ ​Wu,​ ​G.​ ​(1999).​ ​On​ ​The​ ​Shape​ ​Of​ ​The​ ​Probability​ ​Weighting​ ​Function.​ ​​Cognitive​ ​Psychology​, 
38​(1),​ ​129-166. 
65​ ​Kahneman,​ ​D.,​ ​Fredrickson,​ ​B.​ ​L.,​ ​Schreiber,​ ​C.​ ​A.,​ ​&​ ​Redelmeier,​ ​D.​ ​A.​ ​(1993).​ ​When​ ​More​ ​Pain​ ​is​ ​Preferred​ ​to 
Less:​ ​Adding​ ​a​ ​Better​ ​End.​ ​​Psychological​ ​Science​ ​(0956-7976)​,​ ​​4​(6),​ ​401-405. 
66​ ​Kahneman,​ ​D.​ ​(2003).​ ​Maps​ ​Of​ ​Bounded​ ​Rationality:​ ​Psychology​ ​For​ ​Behavioral​ ​Economics.​ ​​The​ ​American 
Economic​ ​Review​,​ ​​93​(5),​ ​1449-1475. 
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has gone from four million dollars to three million dollars. The second individual, ​B​, is informed                
that their wealth has gone from one million dollars to one and a quarter million dollars. Now                 
think about the following questions: Who has more reason to be satisfied with their financial               
situation? Who is happier? In absolute terms, person A should be happier with their situation               
because their total wealth is higher. However, it is easy to understand that person B is more                 
content because their wealth increased and that change ultimately gives them more utility and              
psychological pleasure. This highlights the usefulness of reference points found at the core of              
prospect theory. The status quo, or an individual’s current wealth, typically serves as the              
reference point. People evaluate a risk based on their financial situation in addition to their risk                
tolerance. In some cases, Kahneman and Tversky note that the reference point could be defined               
as the anticipated level of wealth. Take, for instance, a stock broker who purchases a large                
number of shares. Depending on his investment strategy or goal, he may consider his reference               
point the price at which he bought the stock or perhaps his expectation of how much the stock                  
should cost. In the former scenario, if the stock rises he will experience a gain and positive                 
utility, whereas in the latter situation if the stock does not reach the anticipated price, he will                 
consider​ ​it​ ​a​ ​loss.  
The previous scenario also touches upon another attribute of Kahneman and Tversky’s            
model - loss aversion. They provide the following graph that depicts a typical utility function               
under prospect theory. The fact that the value function is not symmetrical across the origin               
indicates that individuals experience the disutility of a loss as greater than the satisfaction from               
an​ ​equivalent​ ​gain.​ ​The​ ​psychological​ ​pain​ ​associated​ ​with​ ​a​ ​loss​ ​results​ ​in​ ​loss​ ​aversion.  
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​ ​  
 
Loss aversion also ties into the different behaviors under risk. Prospect theory reports that              
people are risk averse in gains, but risk seeking in losses. For instance, most people prefer $3000                 
for sure over an 80% chance of $4000. Note that under expected utility theory the second choice                 
corresponds with a higher payoff and is the predicted option. Now, to reverse the gambles into                
the negative domain, consider the choice between losing $3000 for sure or losing $4000 with an                
80% chance. In this case, most participants chose the risky option, although expected utility              
again predicts the opposite outcome. Prospect theory allows for more complex value judgments             
under​ ​risk,​ ​explaining​ ​why​ ​people​ ​seek​ ​risk​ ​in​ ​losses​ ​but​ ​avoid​ ​it​ ​in​ ​positive​ ​gambles.  
Diminishing sensitivity also refers to the slope of the value function. As the monetary              
amount increases, and moves further from the origin, people experience smaller gains in             
psychological value. Similarly, as losses grow, the additional disutility increases but at a slower              
rate. Kahneman and Tversky argue that the difference in emotional response between winning             
$100 and $200 is much greater than the difference between winning $1100 and $1200. This               
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further supports the notion that individuals evaluate choices based on relative changes rather than              
final​ ​states.  
Prospect theory is now nearly forty years old and remains the best descriptive model of               
behavior under risk (Barberis, 2013). Yet, prospect theory is still not widely applied in              67
economic theory and has only recently begun gaining traction in the general field. Although the               
seminal paper was published in ​Econometrica, ​the authors are psychologists so their research             
methods differ from that of economists. Economists were initially skeptical that their data would              
be relevant outside a laboratory setting. Secondly, Barberis (2013) argues that the theory is              
intrinsically difficult to apply to traditional economic models though it retains its validity outside              
a laboratory setting. For instance, he asks what type of portfolio an investor will choose given                
they have preferences that align with prospect theory. As mentioned earlier, the complicated part              
of the analysis in this scenario is determining the reference point. Does it apply to the investor’s                 
total wealth or just the value of the portfolio? Furthermore, is a gain any positive return on the                  
stock or a return above what the investor expected to earn? The complexities of pinpointing a                
reference point in these types of situations led many economists to avoid prospect theory.              
Fortunately, he describes how a range of subfields in economics have recently utilized prospect              
theory​ ​to​ ​refine​ ​their​ ​research​ ​and​ ​made​ ​progress​ ​in​ ​rationalizing​ ​some​ ​behaviors.  
In the field of finance, prospect theory can explain why positively skewed stocks are              
often overpriced, over-purchased, and yield lower than average returns (Barberis and Huang,            
2008). A positively skewed stock simply means that the right tail of its distribution is longer                68
67 ​ ​​Barberis,​ ​N.​ ​C.​ ​(2013).​ ​Thirty​ ​Years​ ​Of​ ​Prospect​ ​Theory​ ​In​ ​Economics:​ ​A​ ​Review​ ​And​ ​Assessment.​ ​​The​ ​Journal 
of​ ​Economic​ ​Perspectives​,​ ​27(1),​ ​173-195. 
68​ ​Barberis,​ ​N.,​ ​&​ ​Huang,​ ​M.​ ​(2008).​ ​Stocks​ ​As​ ​Lotteries:​ ​The​ ​Implications​ ​Of​ ​Probability​ ​Weighting​ ​For​ ​Security 
Prices.​ ​​The​ ​American​ ​Economic​ ​Review​,​ ​​98​(5),​ ​2066-2100. 
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than its left tail. In other words, the stock has an extremely low chance of becoming highly                 
valuable. Nevertheless, given that prospect theory predicts people will overweight low           
probabilities, these positively skewed stocks appear more valuable to investors although they            
typically have low rates of return. Prospect theory explains why people will overprice such              
stocks that have a slim potential of becoming “the next Google” (Barberis, 2013, p. 181). This                
contrasts the expected utility model in that people have an overly optimistic expectation of the               
stock’s price. Moreover, data from the stock market indicates that positively skewed stocks             
normally have below average returns. In other words, the chances of moving into that right tail                
region is extremely low. Expected utility theory fails to account for the empirical data that               
individuals overprice these skewed stocks that offer small returns whereas prospect theory can             
model​ ​such​ ​behavior. 
Loss aversion is also able to account for the seemingly strange behavior of investors              
regarding high earning stocks. Research indicates that brokers and other trading experts are more              
likely to sell stocks that have a positive return than they are to sell stocks with a negative return                   
(Odean, 1998). Furthermore, stock market data show that well performing stocks continue their             69
upward trend whereas those in the negative typically fail to gain positive momentum. Investors              
hesitate to sell losing stocks because of the convexity of the value function over losses (Shefrin                
& Statman, 1985). Recall that prospect theory claims individuals are risk seeking for losses but               70
risk averse over gains. Traders refuse to sell underperforming stocks on the off-chance that they               
begin​ ​to​ ​do​ ​well​ ​and​ ​break​ ​even.  
69​ ​Odean,​ ​T.​ ​(1998).​ ​Are​ ​Investors​ ​Reluctant​ ​To​ ​Realize​ ​Their​ ​Losses?.​ ​​The​ ​Journal​ ​Of​ ​Finance​,​ ​​53​(5),​ ​1775-1798. 
70​ ​Shefrin,​ ​H.,​ ​&​ ​Statman,​ ​M.​ ​(1985).​ ​The​ ​Disposition​ ​To​ ​Sell​ ​Winners​ ​Too​ ​Early​ ​And​ ​Ride​ ​Losers​ ​Too​ ​Long: 
Theory​ ​And​ ​Evidence.​ ​​The​ ​Journal​ ​Of​ ​Finance​,​ ​​40​(3),​ ​777-790. 
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Prospect theory has been applicable in explaining how wages influence labor supply. The             
research focuses on taxi drivers because those workers are able to choose how many hours they                
work each day, an assumption common to traditional labor models. Data on cab drivers              
demonstrate an inverse relationship between number of hours worked and the hourly wage             
(Camerer et al., 1997). Cab drivers set a target income for each day and typically stop working                 71
as soon as they hit that value. On days when the demand for taxis is high, the drivers reach their                    
goal more quickly and work fewer hours. However, on slower days the drivers must work for a                 
longer amount of time in order to reach their target income. The loss aversion component of                
prospect theory supplements this analysis by explaining that not achieving the set target by $30               
feels disproportionately worse than the joy felt when surpassing the goal by $30. Traditional              
economic models that uphold the assumption of perfect rationality fail to resolve this behavior. A               
rational agent would work longer hours when the demand for cabs is higher to compensate for                
the​ ​days​ ​when​ ​demand​ ​and​ ​hence​ ​wages​ ​are​ ​lower.  
The previous studies demonstrate modes of thinking that violate the economic definition            
of rationality. People are loss averse and use cognitive shortcuts in their reasoning. Moreover,              
individuals have a less than perfect understanding of statistics, which leads to calculation errors              
in risk and other decisions. The anchoring heuristic illustrates how irrelevant values can distort              
judgments, and people fail to discount extraneous information during information processing.           
The following literature explores further departures from von Neumann and Morgenstern’s           
model,​ ​which​ ​illustrated​ ​economic​ ​agents​ ​as​ ​income​ ​maximizers.  
71​ ​Camerer,​ ​C.,​ ​Babcock,​ ​L.,​ ​Loewenstein,​ ​G.,​ ​&​ ​Thaler,​ ​R.​ ​(1997).​ ​Labor​ ​supply​ ​of​ ​New​ ​York​ ​City​ ​cabdrivers:​ ​One 




The traditional, economic notion of self-interest and rationality seems to preclude high            
rates of prosocial behaviors and altruism. Altruism appears at odds with self-interest; why would              
an egoistic agent behave in a way that increases another individual’s welfare? The foundation of               
von Neumann and Morgenstern’s game theory rests on the assumption that an economic agent              
will try to maximize their own utility. Moreover, there are skeptics that deny the existence of                
pure altruism- the idea that an altruistic action has no egoistic motive behind it. Even selfless acts                 
can be framed into self-interested ones by claiming that the actor wants to relieve their own                
distress or discomfort, they desire praise, or they wish to avoid shame (Batson, 2013). The               72
debate has gone on through the centuries and much of Western philosophy has sided with the                
skeptics, insisting that even the most altruistic acts can be traced to egoistic origins. For the                
intents and purposes of this essay, the more pertinent question is whether altruistic (or              
pseudoaltruistic)​ ​actions​ ​violate​ ​the​ ​principle​ ​of​ ​rationality.  
Although Adam Smith believed in the capacity for people to do good and to cooperate in                
society, he too asserted that self-interest was at play. However, Smith’s concept of self-interest              
was quite different from the form it has taken today. He incorporated the needs of others into his                  
framework and understood the power of empathy and compassion inherent to human nature. The              
perception of self-interest has become distorted over the years and can account for the              
misconceptions many people have for the term. Oliver Williamson, a Nobel prize winning             
economist, writes that rational agents are characterized by “self-interest seeking with guile            
[which] includes...forms, such as lying, stealing, or cheating… [and] more often involves subtle             
72​ ​Batson,​ ​C.​ ​D.​ ​(2014).​ ​​The​ ​Altruism​ ​Question:​ ​Toward​ ​A​ ​Social-psychological​ ​Answer​.​ ​Psychology​ ​Press. 
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forms of deceit” (Williamson, 1985, p. 47). Smith would likely be appalled by such a negative                73
portrayal of human behavior in the marketplace. In his view, such a society could not survive                
because consumers care about fairness and would refrain from purchasing goods from unfair             
sellers. Deceit and cheating was a surefire way to mar one’s reputation and ruin a business. Yet,                 
by​ ​the​ ​late​ ​20th​ ​century,​ ​such​ ​behavior​ ​seems​ ​to​ ​have​ ​become​ ​normalized.  
Recent research has explored whether this negative view of human society is an accurate              
representation of behavior. Social psychologists have investigated whether economics purports          
an unrealistic perception of human behavior and continue to identify ways in which some              
altruistic​ ​actions​ ​contradict​ ​the​ ​notion​ ​of​ ​rationality.  
Fehr and Gachter focus their research on reciprocity, which occurs when “the actor is              
responding to friendly or hostile actions even if no material gains can be expected” (2000, p.                
160). Reciprocity can be differentiated further into positive and negative reciprocity. Positive            74
reciprocity denotes cooperative behaviors that reward fair actions whereas negative reciprocity           
involves retaliation against bad behavior. Instances of positive reciprocity are found in trust             
games. The trust game is played by two individuals, in which the first receives a sum of money                  
from the experimenter and is asked to share any amount ranging from zero to the whole sum.                 
The second player receives triple the share that the first player sent over. Now the second player                 
has​ ​the​ ​opportunity​ ​to​ ​send​ ​back​ ​any​ ​amount​ ​to​ ​the​ ​first​ ​player.  
Studies find that there is a positive correlation between how much the first player sends               
over and how much they receive in return from the second player. In other words, the more                 
money the first player is willing to share with the second, the more money they will receive at                  
73​ ​Williamson,​ ​O.​ ​E.​ ​(1985).​ ​​The​ ​Economic​ ​Institutions​ ​Of​ ​Capitalism​.​ ​(p.47).​ ​Simon​ ​and​ ​Schuster. 
74 ​ ​​Fehr,​ ​E.,​ ​&​ ​Gächter,​ ​S.​ ​(2000).​ ​Fairness​ ​And​ ​Retaliation:​ ​The​ ​Economics​ ​Of​ ​Reciprocity.​ ​​The​ ​Journal​ ​Of 
Economic​ ​Perspectives​,​ ​​14​(3),​ ​159-181. 
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the end of the game when the amount is tripled. This effect demonstrates a two-fold altruism.                
The first player gives the second player a larger split of the sum in the hopes that the return will                    
be worthwhile. This does not fall under pure altruism because there is a self-interested motive               
involved. It does imply, however, as the name of the game suggests, a degree of trust that the                  
second player will redistribute some of the newly accumulated wealth. Additionally, the second             
player is left with the choice of how altruistically to behave. After receiving the split, they can                 
choose to leave nothing to the first player and act in an entirely self-interested manner. However,                
the results indicate that people reciprocate generosity if they receive it. There is no opportunity               
for reputation building. The salient variable is how much the first player was willing to offer in                 
the first round of the game. Interestingly, raising the monetary stakes of the game did not                
significantly influence the results. When the trust game was conducted in Moscow and             
participants earned on average ten weeks worth of income in a two hour experiment, the rates of                 
positive​ ​reciprocity​ ​were​ ​still​ ​high​ ​(Fehr​ ​et​ ​al.,​ ​2002).   75
Another notable issue that arises from assuming people are income-maximizers is           
free-riding. Free riding is defined as “the absence of contribution towards the provision of a               
public good by an individual, even though he or she will not be excluded from benefiting from                 
that good” (Marwell & Ames, 1981, p.296). If contribution is voluntary, then it is in the                76
individual’s best interest not to invest in the public good but still reap the benefits from it. The                  
rational agent can maximize his utility by free-riding. Yet, real world data indicate that              
free-riding is not a monumental issue. One example of supposedly irrational behavior is donating              
75​ ​Fehr,​ ​E.,​ ​Fischbacher,​ ​U.,​ ​&​ ​Tougareva,​ ​E.​ ​(2002).​ ​Do​ ​high​ ​stakes​ ​and​ ​competition​ ​undermine​ ​fairness?​ ​Evidence 
from​ ​Russia. 
76​ ​Marwell,​ ​G.,​ ​&​ ​Ames,​ ​R.​ ​E.​ ​(1981).​ ​Economists​ ​Free​ ​Ride,​ ​Does​ ​Anyone​ ​Else?:​ ​Experiments​ ​On​ ​The​ ​Provision 
Of​ ​Public​ ​Goods,​ ​Iv.​ ​​Journal​ ​Of​ ​Public​ ​Economics​,​ ​15(3),​ ​295-310. 
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to charity. It is an optional behavior that typically has no direct impact on the benefactor’s                
welfare.​ ​Still,​ ​hundreds​ ​of​ ​billions​ ​of​ ​dollars​ ​are​ ​donated​ ​to​ ​charity​ ​each​ ​year​ ​(Giving​ ​USA).   77
In a public goods experiment, data indicate that if punishment is possible, a minority of               
people exhibiting reciprocal behavior can force a majority of self-interested agents into            
cooperating (Fehr & Gachter, 2000). A public goods game is one in which several participants               78
endowed with a sum of money choose to contribute to a group exchange or a private exchange.                 
Money invested in the group is then split among all the participants, regardless of whether or not                 
they contributed. The private exchange, on the other hand, acts more like a storage place for the                 
money and is returned to the participant. The researchers conduct the experiment with two              
conditions, one in which punishment is not possible and the second where it is an option, albeit a                  
costly one. In the first condition, economic models predict that every individual will free ride.               
Additionally, even when punishment is possible in the other experimental setting, self-interested            
agents​ ​will​ ​not​ ​punish​ ​because​ ​the​ ​action​ ​is​ ​costly​ ​and​ ​they​ ​want​ ​to​ ​maximize​ ​their​ ​own​ ​utility.  
What they find is that when punishment is absent, a majority of the participants free ride,                
and those who do contribute to the public good only contribute a small amount. Note that even                 
after ten periods, some participants are reluctant to free ride and deviate from the prediction of                
traditional economic models. When given the chance to punish free riders, even at a cost, the                
reciprocal types are able to encourage cooperation. In fact, the study finds that in the final period                 
82.5% of participants contributed their entire endowment to the public good. The high rate of               
contribution and cooperation defies economic models especially because such behavior provides           
evidence of a stable equilibrium, not just an anomalous result. The results do not imply that                
77​ ​"Giving​ ​Statistics."​ ​​Charity​ ​Navigator​.​ ​Giving​ ​USA,​ ​n.d.​ ​Web.​ ​11​ ​Apr.​ ​2017. 
78​ ​​Fehr,​ ​E.,​ ​&​ ​Gächter,​ ​S.​ ​(2000).​ ​Cooperation​ ​and​ ​Punishment​ ​in​ ​Public​ ​Goods​ ​Experiments.​ ​​American​ ​Economic 
Review​,​ ​​90​(4),​ ​980-994. 
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self-interest does not exist. Rather, it demonstrates that even self-interested individuals can act             
generously under certain conditions. Furthermore, in the punishment condition, individuals are           
still acting rationally when contributing large amounts to the public good. They realize that              
free-riding is a costly action and will be punished, so the rational response is to invest in the                  
public​ ​good.  
Given the examples of behavior violating strict self-interest, economists began          
developing new descriptive models for decision making. They did not view the results from              
experimental data as a threat to the discipline, nor did they deem it as completely revolutionary.                
When new and reliable information challenges the assumptions of traditional models, they are             
revisited and refined. Thus, behavioral research gave rise to models of social preferences. Fehr              
and Gachter (2000) proposed a model of reciprocity, as seen above, illustrating how individuals              
with purely self-interested motives can alter their behavior in order to reward altruism or punish               
greediness. Another example of a model with social preferences is the inequity-aversion model             79
which shows how individuals want to avoid polar outcomes and prefer to maintain equality (Fehr               
& Schmidt 1999). Lastly, social welfare models assert that people want to increase social              80
surplus​ ​particularly​ ​by​ ​caring​ ​for​ ​those​ ​who​ ​are​ ​worse​ ​off​ ​(Charness​ ​&​ ​Rabin,​ ​2002).   81
Crockett et al. (2014) demonstrate how social preferences influence behaviors involving           
pain. They find that care for others is more salient than self-care. Participants were randomly               82
79​ ​Fehr,​ ​E.,​ ​&​ ​Gächter,​ ​S.​ ​(2000).​ ​Fairness​ ​And​ ​Retaliation:​ ​The​ ​Economics​ ​Of​ ​Reciprocity.​ ​​The​ ​Journal​ ​Of 
Economic​ ​Perspectives​,​ ​​14​(3),​ ​159-181. 
80​ ​Fehr,​ ​E.,​ ​&​ ​Schmidt,​ ​K.​ ​M.​ ​(1999).​ ​A​ ​Theory​ ​Of​ ​Fairness,​ ​Competition,​ ​And​ ​Cooperation.​ ​​The​ ​Quarterly​ ​Journal 
Of​ ​Economics​,​ ​​114​(3),​ ​817-868. 
81​ ​Charness,​ ​G.,​ ​&​ ​Rabin,​ ​M.​ ​(2002).​ ​Understanding​ ​Social​ ​Preferences​ ​With​ ​Simple​ ​Tests.​ ​​The​ ​Quarterly​ ​Journal​ ​of 
Economics​,​ ​​117​(3),​ ​817-869. 
82​ ​Crockett,​ ​M.​ ​J.,​ ​Kurth-Nelson,​ ​Z.,​ ​Siegel,​ ​J.​ ​Z.,​ ​Dayan,​ ​P.,​ ​&​ ​Dolan,​ ​R.​ ​J.​ ​(2014).​ ​Harm​ ​To​ ​Others​ ​Outweighs 
Harm​ ​To​ ​Self​ ​In​ ​Moral​ ​Decision​ ​Making.​ ​​Proceedings​ ​of​ ​the​ ​National​ ​Academy​ ​of​ ​Sciences​,​ ​​111​(48),​ ​17320-17325. 
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divided into two roles, decider and receiver, and the identity of the other was always kept                
anonymous. The decider received numerous prompts regarding electric shocks and a monetary            
amount to either increase or decrease them. Half the time the decider would be given the shocks,                 
and the other times the shock would be administered to the receiver. Since identities remained               
anonymous, there was no possibility for retaliation, judgment, or reciprocity from the other             
individual.​ ​Nevertheless,​ ​the​ ​results​ ​indicate​ ​the​ ​presence​ ​of​ ​altruistic​ ​behaviors.  
The decider placed more importance on the pain of the receiver than they did on their                
own pain. Namely, the decider was willing to pay more money to reduce the number of shocks to                  
the other individual. Furthermore, they were less likely to harm the receiver and frequently chose               
more shocks for themselves relative to their partner. Deciders placed a higher cost on the pain of                 
the other than pain for one’s self. In other words, they demanded more money to increase the                 
number of shocks to the receiver than to themselves and were willing to pay more in order to                  
decrease​ ​the​ ​shocks​ ​administered​ ​to​ ​the​ ​other​ ​than​ ​to​ ​themselves.  
The researchers argue that these results go against the reigning economic theory that             
people value their monetary outcome as far more important than the monetary outcome of their               
peers. This is not conclusive evidence that people are in fact selfless and care more for their                 
neighbors than for themselves. However, the value of the results lies in the fact that even under                 
conditions meant to minimize concerns of reciprocity and punishment avoidance, a majority of             
participants acted altruistically. Although the paper does not explore in depth the motivating             
factors behind the altruistic and selfless behavior of the deciders, the results clearly support that               
social preferences impact decision making. In choosing to accept less money to reduce the pain               
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of someone else, the decider implies that the welfare of the receiver is an important factor in                 
one’s​ ​own​ ​utility.  
Concerns about fairness are influential in pricing models and labor markets. Although the             
basic model of supply and demand dictates that a demand shock should result in an increase in                 
price, most consumers view such behavior as unfair (Kahneman et al., 1986). Market prices and               83
a history of transactions serve as the reference point for consumers. If a firm increases its price,                 
when costs remain the same and profits are not threatened, the consumer feels slighted and               
deems the action unfair. Similarly, a firm reducing a worker’s wage because of lower wages at                
competing firms is judged as unfair. However, if that worker leaves and the new employee               
receives​ ​the​ ​lower​ ​wage,​ ​most​ ​people​ ​view​ ​that​ ​action​ ​as​ ​fair.  
  
83​ ​Kahneman,​ ​D.,​ ​Knetsch,​ ​J.​ ​L.,​ ​&​ ​Thaler,​ ​R.​ ​(1986).​ ​Fairness​ ​As​ ​A​ ​Constraint​ ​On​ ​Profit​ ​Seeking:​ ​Entitlements​ ​In 
The​ ​Market.​ ​​The​ ​American​ ​Economic​ ​Review​,​ ​728-741. 
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Chapter​ ​Three:​ ​Mediating​ ​Factors​ ​of​ ​Decision-Making 
 
The previous chapter illustrated how human behavior differs from predictions of           
economics models. In particular, people’s preferences are not stable over gains and losses, or              
over time. Observed behavior does not conform to the axioms put forth by von Neumann and                
Morgenstern. However, these deviations from rationality do not stop there. As the field of              
behavioral economics grew, the research analyzed more specific demographic data. In order to             
find the mediating factors behind “irrational” behavior, psychologists and economists alike           
looked at professions, education, culture, and experience. Interestingly, studies demonstrate that           
economists, both students with a degree in the field or people experienced in business, perform               
more rationally than their inexperienced counterparts. This correlation gives rise to questions of             
validity​ ​and​ ​accuracy​ ​of​ ​economic​ ​models.  
Economics​ ​Majors  
Returning to the public goods game, Marwell and Ames set up several experiments to              
investigate contributions while manipulating several variables, including area of study (1981).           84
Participants were given a certain number of tokens which they could then invest in either an                
individual or group exchange. The individual exchange had a low and fixed rate of return on the                 
investment, regardless of the investment decisions of other players. The group exchange had a              
significantly higher rate of return but everyone received a share of the tokens invested in the                
group regardless of who invested in the group. Therefore, the social incentive is to invest all                
84​ ​Marwell,​ ​G.,​ ​&​ ​Ames,​ ​R.​ ​E.​ ​(1981).  
 
Broda​ ​59 
tokens in the group exchange and everyone profits substantially more than they would in the               
individual exchange. On the other hand, each participant has the incentive to invest only in the                
private​ ​exchange​ ​and​ ​free​ ​ride​ ​on​ ​the​ ​returns​ ​from​ ​the​ ​group​ ​investment.  
Before conducting the actual experiment, the researchers sent the procedure and           
experimental design to six economists, asking them for their predictions on the results based on               
economic theory. Four of the economists said that no one would invest any tokens in the group                 
exchange and one stated that the invested amount would be less than five percent. The               
economists, however, did clarify that the participants would likely stray from the theory and              
invest on average 20% of their tokens in the public good. These amended results were explained                
by​ ​a​ ​combination​ ​of​ ​increased​ ​risk​ ​taking​ ​and​ ​participants​ ​behaving​ ​irrationally.  
Already the economists’ predictions give rise to skepticism. It is problematic to see that              
economists are aware that most participants will stray from the predictions made by the models.               
In that case, should the models be readdressed to account for their lack of external validity? This                 
question will be explored later, after a more thorough investigation into the divergence of              
economic​ ​theory​ ​and​ ​experimental​ ​data.  
Marwell and Ames conducted a series of experiments, altering the conditions several            
times, but found consistent results. The various conditions included providing skewed resources            
to some participants, using experienced players from previous trials, and a group of exclusively              
graduate students in economics. Under every condition, the free-riding hypothesis was refuted.            
Participants in all but one set of conditions invested on average between 40% and 60% of their                 
tokens. This is not the socially optimal amount of investing everything, but it is a substantial                
difference from the prediction of economic theory and the predictions of the economists citing              
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irrational behavior. The outliers of the experiment were the graduate students in economics.             
They only invested on average 20% of the tokens. This finding still contradicts the free-riding               
hypothesis,​ ​but​ ​it​ ​is​ ​significantly​ ​different​ ​from​ ​the​ ​other​ ​results.  
Marwell and Ames’ study suggests that economists behave differently from the           
non-economists. This assertion is strengthened by a survey that the two researchers gave out              
following the experiment. The questionnaire asked what is a fair amount to invest in the group                
exchange and whether the participant took into account fairness when making an investment             
decision. Again the economists stood out. One third of them refused to answer the question               
regarding a fair amount or gave complex and uncodable responses. Of those who complied and               
responded, most claimed that a small sum or even no investment was fair. Finally, the economics                
students were only half as likely as the other students to say that they were “concerned with                 
fairness.”  
The Marwell and Ames study reveals an interesting gap between economists and            
non-economists. The economists demonstrated more self-interested behavior, which could in          
turn be called rational decision making by their fellow peers. However, no one group behaved in                
accordance to economic theory. How can the theory be reconciled with the experimental data,              
and​ ​more​ ​importantly,​ ​should​ ​it​ ​be?  
Before​ ​delving​ ​further​ ​into​ ​the​ ​literature,​ ​it​ ​is​ ​important​ ​to​ ​understand​ ​the​ ​ultimatum 
game​ ​because​ ​the​ ​following​ ​studies​ ​rely​ ​heavily​ ​on​ ​this​ ​task.​ ​Developed​ ​in​ ​1982,​ ​the​ ​ultimatum 
game​ ​is​ ​a​ ​task​ ​used​ ​to​ ​measure​ ​fairness​ ​and​ ​decision​ ​making​ ​with​ ​monetary​ ​outcomes​ ​(Guth, 
1982). ​ ​Typically,​ ​there​ ​are​ ​two​ ​players​ ​in​ ​every​ ​round-​ ​a​ ​proposer​ ​and​ ​a​ ​responder.​ ​The 85
85​ ​Güth,​ ​W.,​ ​Schmittberger,​ ​R.,​ ​&​ ​Schwarze,​ ​B.​ ​(1982).​ ​An​ ​Experimental​ ​Analysis​ ​Of​ ​Ultimatum​ ​Bargaining. 
Journal​ ​Of​ ​Economic​ ​Behavior​ ​&​ ​Organization​,​ ​​3​(4),​ ​367-388. 
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proposer​ ​receives​ ​a​ ​sum​ ​of​ ​money​ ​and​ ​has​ ​to​ ​split​ ​the​ ​money​ ​with​ ​the​ ​second​ ​player.​ ​The 
responder​ ​receives​ ​an​ ​offer​ ​and​ ​decides​ ​whether​ ​or​ ​not​ ​to​ ​accept​ ​it.​ ​Should​ ​the​ ​responder​ ​accept, 
the​ ​money​ ​is​ ​allocated​ ​according​ ​to​ ​the​ ​proposer’s​ ​offer.​ ​However,​ ​if​ ​the​ ​offer​ ​is​ ​rejected,​ ​neither 
player​ ​gets​ ​any​ ​money.​ ​The​ ​prediction​ ​of​ ​economic​ ​theory​ ​is​ ​that​ ​the​ ​responder​ ​will​ ​accept​ ​any 
positive​ ​offer​ ​because​ ​they​ ​will​ ​be​ ​slightly​ ​richer​ ​than​ ​they​ ​were​ ​prior​ ​to​ ​the​ ​experiment. 
Carter and Irons follow the path of the previous set of experiments but concentrate on the                
differences between economics majors and students in other disciplines (1991). They set up an              86
ultimatum game scenario with four groups- first year students studying economics, first years not              
studying economics, seniors majoring in economics, and seniors majoring in anything but            
economics. Their findings are in line with those of Marwell and Ames. Namely, economics              
students accept smaller amounts in the ultimatum game and also offer smaller amounts to the               
partner. In other words, economists behave more closely to the predictions of economic models;              
however, they are still not perfectly rational. The rational choice, as dictated by economic              
thought, is to offer the smallest amount possible and the responder to accept any positive offer.                
Again​ ​the​ ​true​ ​behavior​ ​of​ ​participants​ ​is​ ​far​ ​off​ ​from​ ​the​ ​expectations​ ​of​ ​the​ ​model.  
Carter and Irons also ask the question of whether self-interested behavior is learned             
throughout the course of study or if students self-select into the major. They find support for the                 
selection hypothesis in that first year economists already accept smaller amounts and propose to              
keep more for themselves than first year students in other majors. Secondly, the difference in               
behavior between economics students in their senior year compared to their first year actually              
narrows. So studying economic models and learning more about the assumption of rationality             
86​ ​Carter,​ ​J.​ ​R.,​ ​&​ ​Irons,​ ​M.​ ​D.​ ​(1991).​ ​Are​ ​Economists​ ​Different,​ ​And​ ​If​ ​So,​ ​Why?.​ ​​The​ ​Journal​ ​of​ ​Economic 
Perspectives​,​ ​​5​(2),​ ​171-177. 
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does little to affect the decision making of students. Therefore, the study finds little support for                
the​ ​learning​ ​hypothesis​ ​and​ ​further​ ​reinforces​ ​Marwell​ ​and​ ​Ames’​ ​findings.  
In another ultimatum game experiment conducted by Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler,           
students at a Canadian University split the money differently depending on the major of the other                
player (1986). In particular, they found that the most generous offers were made by psychology               87
students to other psychology students. The offers slightly declined when they were being made              
to students in an economics course and lastly, the economics students offered the least amount of                
money​ ​to​ ​the​ ​psychology​ ​students.  
This raises the question of why the students thought it was acceptable to propose various               
offers depending on the other player. Splitting the money in the ultimatum game cannot simply               
be explained by fairness in this case because fairness should in theory be applied universally. Did                
the students feel some sort of solidarity with their peers? Or perhaps they were being guided by                 
the expectations of what the other player would do, assuming that the economists would be               
willing​ ​to​ ​accept​ ​smaller​ ​offers.  
Yet another common experiment used in economics is the prisoner’s dilemma. The            
payoff matrix is included below. The current economic theory asserts that people will always              
defect. Defecting has a higher payoff regardless of the other player’s action but if both players                
defect​ ​they​ ​receive​ ​a​ ​lower​ ​reward​ ​than​ ​for​ ​cooperating.  





Frank, Gilovich, and Regan looked at how economics students behave compared to those             
in other disciplines using the prisoner’s dilemma with the above matrix (1993). They found the               88
defection rate for economics students to be 60.4% whereas the defection rate for non-economics              
majors was only 38.8%. Economists displayed more self-interested behavior and by a significant             
margin. Even controlling for effects of gender, since economics students are predominantly male             
and thus less likely to cooperate, the regression analysis showed that economics majors were              
17%​ ​more​ ​likely​ ​to​ ​defect​ ​than​ ​other​ ​majors.  
The study also included three conditions which allowed for some interaction between the             
players prior to playing the game. The unlimited condition gave the students 30 minutes to talk                
to the other two players they would be matched with and allowed them to make promises to one                  
another to cooperate, although these promises were unenforceable during the experiment. The            
second condition did not allow for promises but still gave the participants 30 minutes to talk.                
Lastly, the third condition only allocated 10 minutes of interaction before the experiment started.              
The defection rates were highest in the “limited” 10 minute condition, declined in the              
intermediate condition, and fell significantly when participants were allowed to make promises.            
88​ ​Frank,​ ​R.​ ​H.,​ ​Gilovich,​ ​T.,​ ​&​ ​Regan,​ ​D.​ ​T.​ ​(1993).​ ​Does​ ​Studying​ ​Economics​ ​Inhibit​ ​Cooperation?.​ ​​The​ ​Journal​ ​of 
Economic​ ​Perspectives​,​ ​​7​(2),​ ​159-171. 
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Furthermore, the divergent behavior between economics students and others nearly vanishes in            
the unlimited condition. Of the economics majors, 28% defected, and 26% of the other majors               
defected in this condition. A promise, though unenforceable, seems to reassure both groups of              
students into cooperating. The uncertainty and risk of losing, therefore, is at the forefront of the                
economists’​ ​minds​ ​and​ ​might​ ​drive​ ​their​ ​self-interested​ ​behavior.  
The considerable difference is shown in the remaining two conditions in which            
economists defect 72% of the time compared to a 47% defection rate in other students. One                
possible explanation for this disparity is that economics majors expect others to defect. That is               
the lesson they were taught in their courses, and if they believe that the other player will defect, it                   
is in their best interest to defect as well. To investigate this possibility, the researchers sent out a                  
questionnaire to students asking what they would do in a scenario in which they were sure that                 
the other player would cooperate. Oddly enough, 58% of economics students claimed that they              
would still defect. This contrasts the experimental finding of the unlimited condition where 28%              
of the economists cooperated after making a promise. So although expectations of the other              
player’s​ ​action​ ​influences​ ​the​ ​behavior,​ ​it​ ​does​ ​not​ ​explain​ ​the​ ​full​ ​picture.  
Shafir and Thaler (2006) present how framing shapes mental accounting and can result             89
in odd explanations for purchasing and investing in certain goods. They initially ran an              
experiment with a group of wine connoisseurs, some of whom happened to be economists. The               
experiment was twofold in that it included two questionnaires regarding the cost of a bottle of                
wine. In the first scenario, participants were presented with a situation in which they had               
purchased a bottle of wine for $20 many years ago and now the market price rose to $75. The                   
89​ ​Shafir,​ ​E.,​ ​&​ ​Thaler,​ ​R.​ ​H.​ ​(2006).​ ​Invest​ ​now,​ ​drink​ ​later,​ ​spend​ ​never:​ ​On​ ​the​ ​mental​ ​accounting​ ​of​ ​delayed 
consumption.​ ​​Journal​ ​of​ ​economic​ ​psychology​,​ ​​27​(5),​ ​694-712. 
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survey asked how the participants perceived the consumption of the wine, either during a meal or                
by gifting the bottle to someone. In both conditions, 30% of respondents answered that they felt                
as if consuming the wine cost them nothing at all. Some participants stated they felt as if they                  
were saving $55, the difference between the current retail price and the price at time of purchase.                 
The normative economic answer which states that consuming the wine feels like it costs $75,               
was only chosen by a fraction of the respondents, and this was the more likely choice in the                  
“giving away” scenario as opposed to the drinking at dinner example. Furthermore, the “correct”              
answer,​ ​at​ ​least​ ​by​ ​economic​ ​standards,​ ​was​ ​selected​ ​primarily​ ​by​ ​the​ ​economists​ ​of​ ​the​ ​group.  
The second trial of the study presented equivalent price points for the wine but in this                
case a friend dropped the bottle and broke it. The questionnaire asked how much of a loss the                  
participants would feel over the broken bottle. In this case, 55% of the respondents answered that                
the associated cost was $75. Shafir and Thaler refer to this as the replacement cost. The second                 
most popular answer was $20 accounting for 24% of the respondents. The broken bottle example               
led to a majority of people selecting the right answer- the replacement cost. This was not the case                  
however, in the previous trial. Perhaps consuming the bottle during dinner bears less of a cost                
because the individual still gets to enjoy the wine. Yet, in the gift giving scenario, the giver does                  
not get to taste the wine so it should be perceived as a more salient loss. However, the feeling of                    
loss is not intense until the bottle is broken. Moreover, the researchers tracked the answers of the                 
participants from one survey to the next and found that nearly two-thirds of them switched               
answers in the broken bottle scenario. Previously, they responded that the cost of consuming or               
giving away the bottle was zero or even profitable, but now the replacement cost emerges as                
more​ ​important.  
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The crucial economic concept at play in the study is opportunity cost. Economists have a               
strong understanding of this notion, having learned it since the very first introductory economics              
course in undergraduate studies. Shafir and Thaler argue that breaking the bottle of wine makes               
participants consider opportunity costs more readily. Similarly, they point out that if the             
opportunity cost of giving away a bottle equals zero, and breaking the bottle implies that you can                 
no longer give it away, then the cost of breaking the bottle should not be the replacement cost.                  
Nevertheless, the data illustrate some odd results even from seasoned wine connoisseurs and             
economists.  
Although Shafir and Thaler do not mention social preferences, they seem to have a role in                
these experiments. Namely, in the gift giving scenario, individuals do not consider this action as               
a loss because it is an act of charity. Handing a gift to a friend has an immeasurable benefit                   
which is not accounted for in the study’s analysis. Thus, it is not appropriate to equate giving                 
away the bottle to breaking it. Having the wine all over the floor is certainly a loss and a salient                    
one, but to gift the bottle to someone is perceived differently with the benefit seemingly               
outweighing the cost. The other important finding from this study was the responses provided by               
the economists. They were the group that consistently perceived the cost of the wine, in all three                 
scenarios, as a replacement cost. This either indicates that economists place less weight on social               
preferences, or they frame the scenario differently. Economists may have a more nuanced             
definition of cost and not discount the benefit of gift giving to formulate a net change in welfare.                  
Perhaps the economists view the wine as more of an investment, akin to a stock portfolio, and                 
judge its value by the market price, regardless of how much they paid for it. Whatever the reason                  
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may be, Shafir and Thaler demonstrate further evidence for the difference in the reasoning              
processes​ ​of​ ​economists.  
Market​ ​Experience  
List (2003) conducts a study exploring the endowment effect. In particular, he            90
investigates whether the anomaly that individuals place a value on ownership can be reduced              
through market experience. In a way, List attempts to answer the same question as Carter and                
Irons (1991) : do economists behave differently because of their extended exposure to the              
market, or do they have an inherently different mode of reasoning, or entirely different              
preferences, that lead them to self-select into the discipline? The power of List’s study lies in the                 
fact that his data come from a natural setting rather than a lab. He gathers his data from an actual                    
sports card show and collector pin auction and does not have to don a white lab coat in order to                    
conduct​ ​a​ ​formal​ ​experiment​ ​on​ ​preferences.  
List finds that the endowment effect and the number of market interactions are inversely              
proportional. In other words, experienced traders do not exhibit signs of the endowment effect.              
The power of the marketplace leads behavior to converge to neoclassical predictions. The results              
of List’s survey indicate that while approximately 45% of card dealers decide to initiate a trade,                
only 20% of non-dealers choose to do so. Delving further into the data shows that there is a                  
significant difference between experienced non-dealers and inexperienced non-dealers. This         
classification is determined by the average number of trades made each month, with experienced              
non-dealers conducting at least six monthly trades. The data find that inexperienced non-dealers             




only chose to trade away their endowed good 7% of the time whereas experienced non-dealers               
agreed to a trade on 47% of occasions. This finding further supports List’s claim that market                
experience​ ​correlates​ ​to​ ​a​ ​reduction​ ​in​ ​the​ ​endowment​ ​effect.  
List highlights that one of the advantages of his study is that the value of either good                 
supplied to the participants is indeterminable. According to a pretest, both goods are worth about               
the same to experienced dealers but their uniqueness escapes traditional pricing mechanisms.            
List claims that this eliminates some confounds in his field experiment because individuals             
should not have preset preferences for either good in the study. However, for inexperienced              
non-dealers the ambiguous value may lead to confusion. These respondents are not veterans of              
the sports card market and therefore have difficulty distinguishing the worth of one good over               
the other. Therefore, they may exhibit the endowment effect because they do not want to regret                
trading away a good with a potentially higher value. The experienced traders, on the other hand,                
recognize that both goods are of equivalent value and feel comfortable initiating the trade              
approximately half the time. Moreover, List (2004) offers the explanation that experienced            
dealers may receive utility through the very act of trading, which would account for their               
increased​ ​willingness​ ​to​ ​trade.  91
List’s study, however, still is unable to explain the existence of the endowment effect.              
People living in today’s society should have plenty of market experience. Yet, when these              
individuals enter a lab or have to answer a questionnaire in the classroom, the endowment effect                
appears. If the learning hypothesis were true, then market interactions should eliminate this             
phenomenon​ ​by​ ​the​ ​time​ ​people​ ​are​ ​in​ ​college,​ ​as​ ​most​ ​participants​ ​are.  




Factors​ ​Behind​ ​Fairness 
A number of studies have also been conducted that investigate the behavior of children              
and whether they behave in a self-interested manner. Both Murnighan and Saxon (1998) and              92
Harbaugh et al. (2000) find that the youngest children, those around the age of five years old,                 93
act in the most self-interested manner. As they grow older, they begin to grasp the concepts of                 
fairness and equity, particularly proportional rewards or reciprocity. Furthermore, the youngest           
children are also more likely to accept the smallest offers in the ultimatum game. These age                
demographic studies suggest that experience does not necessarily teach individuals to act in a              
more self-interested fashion. Rather, as children develop, their moral principles dictate what a             
fair split of money, or tokens, is. Camerer (2003) goes so far as to point out that the results from                    
the two studies on children align more with economic predictions than any adult population              
studied​ ​thus​ ​far.   94
The willingness to cooperate or act fairly in the ultimatum game is also mediated by the                
identity of the other player. For instance, if people are paired with a computer during the                
experiment (and are aware of that fact) they behave differently than with human agents              
(Sandoval et al., 2015). The study investigated decision making in both the prisoner’s dilemma              95
repeated multiple times and the mini-ultimatum game (mUG). The mUG simply restricts the             
choices available to the proposer which in this case was (.2, .8), (.5, .5), (.8, .2). Results indicate                  
92​ ​Murnighan,​ ​J.​ ​K.,​ ​&​ ​Saxon,​ ​M.​ ​S.​ ​(1998).​ ​Ultimatum​ ​Bargaining​ ​By​ ​Children​ ​and​ ​Adults.​ ​​Journal​ ​of​ ​Economic 
Psychology​,​ ​19(4),​ ​415-445. 
93​ ​Harbaugh,​ ​W.​ ​T.,​ ​&​ ​Krause,​ ​K.​ ​(2000).​ ​Children's​ ​Altruism​ ​In​ ​Public​ ​Good​ ​And​ ​Dictator​ ​Experiments.​ ​​Economic 
Inquiry​,​ ​38(1),​ ​95-109. 
94​ ​Camerer,​ ​C.​ ​(2003).​ ​Behavioral​ ​Game​ ​Theory:​ ​Experiments​ ​In​ ​Strategic​ ​Interaction.​ ​​Princeton​ ​University​ ​Press​. 
95​ ​Sandoval,​ ​E.​ ​B.,​ ​Brandstetter,​ ​J.,​ ​Obaid,​ ​M.,​ ​&​ ​Bartneck,​ ​C.​ ​(2016).​ ​Reciprocity​ ​In​ ​Human-robot​ ​Interaction:​ ​A 
Quantitative​ ​Approach​ ​Through​ ​The​ ​Prisoner’s​ ​Dilemma​ ​And​ ​The​ ​Ultimatum​ ​Game.​ ​​International​ ​Journal​ ​of 
Social​ ​Robotics​,​ ​​8​(2),​ ​303-317. 
 
Broda​ ​70 
that people were less likely to cooperate with the robotic agent. Furthermore, in a comparable               
study, De Melo et al. (2009) found that people collaborated more with a computer if it showed                 
moral emotions than if it did not express any emotions. Their results suggest that our perception                96
of the other player influences decision making and can lead to more altruistic behaviors. Further               
research could explore whether this relates to how we understand the theory of mind. In other                
words, if we think that the other agent has a mind or consciousness, will we act more fairly with                   
them, or is the decision mediated by our perception of the other’s understanding of fairness?               
Sandoval et al. (2016) also report that people offer the smaller, less fair split of money more                 
often to robot players than they do to human participants. In addition, it was uncommon for                
people to split the sum equally with the robot whereas that was the modal choice when playing                 
with another person. The data suggest that participants concern themselves less with fairness             
when dealing with non-human actors. This effect may likely be caused by the fact that robots do                 
not understand the concept of fairness and thus do not feel slighted when they encounter an                
unfair split. Therefore, the participant does not feel as unjust when playing with a computer and                
does​ ​not​ ​receive​ ​the​ ​disutility​ ​from​ ​seeming​ ​like​ ​a​ ​greedy​ ​individual.  
To study the influence of fairness and altruism on decision-making, Forsythe et al. (1994)              
created the dictator game which is closely related to the ultimatum game, except that the second                
player does not have any input in the game. Thus, the fear of an offer being rejected is                  97
eliminated in this game. The offers theoretically portray purely how altruistic the Proposer, or              
Dictator, is. Although the offers were significantly lower than those reported in ultimatum game              
96​ ​De​ ​Melo,​ ​C.​ ​M.,​ ​Zheng,​ ​L.,​ ​&​ ​Gratch,​ ​J.​ ​(2009).​ ​Expression​ ​Of​ ​Moral​ ​Emotions​ ​In​ ​Cooperating​ ​Agents.​ ​In 
International​ ​Workshop​ ​on​ ​Intelligent​ ​Virtual​ ​Agents​​ ​(pp.​ ​301-307).​ ​Springer​ ​Berlin​ ​Heidelberg. 
97​ ​Forsythe,​ ​R.,​ ​Horowitz,​ ​J.​ ​L.,​ ​Savin,​ ​N.​ ​E.,​ ​&​ ​Sefton,​ ​M.​ ​(1994).​ ​Fairness​ ​In​ ​Simple​ ​Bargaining​ ​Experiments. 
Games​ ​And​ ​Economic​ ​Behavior​,​ ​​6​(3),​ ​347-369. 
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experiments, the dictators still violated expectations of game theory by frequently offering            
positive, non-zero amounts. Therefore, even when individuals have no rational reason to offer a              
non-zero amount and maximize their own profit, they choose to part ways with a portion of the                 
sum,​ ​suggesting​ ​that​ ​the​ ​other​ ​person’s​ ​welfare​ ​is​ ​incorporated​ ​into​ ​their​ ​own​ ​utility.  
Social preferences can also induce people to make choices that make them worse off. In               
an atypical study conducted by Ariely and Levav (2000), patrons at a bar were offered free                
samples of four types of beer. In the first condition, the customers placed their orders               98
sequentially and publicly. Under those circumstances, participants who ordered first were           
significantly happier with their choice than those who ordered last. The data indicate that there               
were few instances where a table of four ordered a particular beer twice. Additionally, the               
experimenters rarely observed a group sharing the samples with one another. Therefore, their             
aim was not to order one of each sample and divide them up amongst each other. Rather, each                  
individual wanted to be unique and pick a different beer from the rest of the group. Ariely and                  
Levav theorize that the desire for uniqueness leads people to sacrifice personal utility and              
substitute it for reputational or social utility. In the second condition of this experiment,              
participants chose their beer order simultaneously and privately, on a slip of paper. The results               
from these trials show a lack of variety in people’s orders. There were far more repeats for a                  
particular sample per table. Moreover, when asked to rate the satisfaction with their choice of               
beer, people rated themselves just as happy as the first person to order from the previous                
condition. No longer concerned about their self-image within the group, participants went with             
98​ ​Ariely,​ ​D.,​ ​&​ ​Levav,​ ​J.​ ​(2000).​ ​Sequential​ ​Choice​ ​In​ ​Group​ ​Settings:​ ​Taking​ ​The​ ​Road​ ​Less​ ​Traveled​ ​And​ ​Less 
Enjoyed.​ ​​Journal​ ​Of​ ​Consumer​ ​Research​,​ ​​27​(3),​ ​279-290. 
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the choice that seemed most appealing to them. Evidently, social preferences can also lead to               
sub-optimal​ ​choices.  
Influence​ ​of​ ​Culture  
Ariely claims that the desire to express uniqueness is not universal, but rather a product               
of Western culture. In the West, particularly in the United States, independence and individuality              
are hallmarks of society. Conformity is portrayed negatively, so people try to distinguish             
themselves as much as possible. However, in Eastern cultures, the opposite phenomenon rings             
true. Individuality is seen as breaking off from a group and disregarding social norms.              
Furthermore, Eastern cultures view conformity as desirable because it demonstrates the           
cohesiveness of a group (Kim and Markus, 1999). Ariely also conducted a similar beer sample               99
study in Hong Kong to investigate cultural differences (2008). The results indicate that             100
participants also regretted their choice when ordering publicly rather than privately but for a              
different reason. In this experiment, people regretted their choice because they ordered the same              
dish or beverage as someone else at their table. It was not individuality that caused the disutility,                 
it was conformity. Yet again, social preferences mediate decision-making but result in undesired             
choices. Culture and the surrounding social environment impact how people frame their            
judgments and decisions. This goes beyond the notion in economics that individuals are utility              
maximizers​ ​and​ ​only​ ​interested​ ​in​ ​their​ ​own​ ​personal​ ​gain.  
Culture also acts as a major factor in playing the ultimatum game. Research studies are               
often criticized for using unrepresentative samples since participants are predominantly          
99​ ​Kim,​ ​H.,​ ​&​ ​Markus,​ ​H.​ ​R.​ ​(1999).​ ​Deviance​ ​Or​ ​Uniqueness,​ ​Harmony​ ​Or​ ​Conformity?​ ​A​ ​Cultural​ ​Analysis. 
Journal​ ​Of​ ​Personality​ ​And​ ​Social​ ​Psychology​,​ ​​77​(4),​ ​785. 
100​ ​Ariely,​ ​D.​ ​(2009).​ ​​Predictably​ ​Irrational​​ ​(p.​ ​316).​ ​New​ ​York:​ ​HarperCollins. 
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university students, even in studies exploring cross-cultural effects (Roth et al. 1991). Henrich             101
et al. (2001) take their research even further by using participants from 15 small-scale societies.              
They classify three of these communities as foraging societies, four as nomadic herding              102
groups and so on, demonstrating that these societies have limited, if any, contact with the world                
at large. Their research finds that the traditional economic model and its predictions are violated               
universally, in every society tested. However, the nuanced results they find are evidence of the               
impact​ ​culture​ ​has​ ​on​ ​decision-making​ ​and​ ​prosocial​ ​behavior.  
The data include extremely small splits as well as quite generous offers surpassing the              
50% mark. First and foremost, the societies with the smallest offers still had an average split of                 
over 25% and contradict predictions of the standard economic model. Overall, the mean offers              
ranged from 26% to 58% while the modal offers went from 15% to 50%. Rejection rates also                 
alluded to an interesting phenomenon in which some cultures rarely rejected low offers while              
others frequently rejected fair and even generous offers over 50%. Henrich et al. postulate that               
each society they studied violated traditional economic models albeit in different ways, thus             
suggesting that preferences are influenced by sociocultural norms. Namely, the two crucial            
variables to consider are : 1) payoffs to cooperation- the importance and size of a group’s payoff                 
from cooperating in economic production; 2) market integration- the reliance on market            
exchange​ ​within​ ​a​ ​society​ ​on​ ​a​ ​day-to-day​ ​basis.  
The researchers rationalize their criteria by explaining that in societies where payoffs to             
cooperation are low, individuals are less likely to share resources because they do not see it as an                  
101​ ​Roth,​ ​A.​ ​E.,​ ​Prasnikar,​ ​V.,​ ​Okuno-Fujiwara,​ ​M.,​ ​&​ ​Zamir,​ ​S.​ ​(1991).​ ​Bargaining​ ​And​ ​Market​ ​Behavior​ ​in 
Jerusalem,​ ​Ljubljana,​ ​Pittsburgh,​ ​and​ ​Tokyo:​ ​An​ ​experimental​ ​study.​ ​​The​ ​American​ ​Economic​ ​Review​,​ ​1068-1095. 
102​ ​Henrich,​ ​J.,​ ​Boyd,​ ​R.,​ ​Bowles,​ ​S.,​ ​Camerer,​ ​C.,​ ​Fehr,​ ​E.,​ ​Gintis,​ ​H.,​ ​&​ ​McElreath,​ ​R.​ ​(2001).​ ​In​ ​Search​ ​Of​ ​Homo 
Economicus:​ ​Behavioral​ ​Experiments​ ​In​ ​15​ ​Small-scale​ ​Societies.​​ ​The​ ​American​ ​Economic​ ​Review​,​ ​91(2),​ ​73-78. 
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advantageous behavior. Market integration, on the other hand, illustrates that a higher frequency             
of market interactions, such as trades, will instill abstract notions of sharing with other people. A                
prominent example regarding the power of culture involves the rejection of high offers by tribes               
in New Guinea. In this group, accepting a gift, even if it is unsolicited, signifies a commitment to                  
do the proposer a favor in the near future. Furthermore, exceptionally large or generous gifts               
place the receiver in a subordinate position which only exacerbates the social anxiety associated              
with the choice. Thus, the specific cultural norms in these tribes predicate decision-making and              
behavior in the ultimatum game. Most importantly, higher degrees of market integration            
correlated with not only fairer offers, but also a larger number of fair offers. In a sense, more                  
experience with economics and markets led people to offer larger shares of money. This result               
seems contradictory to the one found in samples of American university students. Experienced             
economic agents were more likely to act in a self-interested manner, but the inverse effect was                






When first approaching the question of why economists behaved differently in           
experimental settings such as the ultimatum game, the learning hypothesis seemed like a             
plausible and obvious answer. By learning about economic models and their predictions, the             
students would be more likely to behave in accordance with what they were taught while earning                
their degree. However, research indicates that economics majors do not act more rationally after              
four years of an undergraduate education. Rather, data suggest that individuals behaving in a              
more rational sense self-select into the discipline. This does not demonstrate that all people who               
are rational-minded end up becoming economics majors. It means, however, that those who do              
choose​ ​economics​ ​as​ ​a​ ​field​ ​of​ ​study​ ​tend​ ​to​ ​act​ ​more​ ​rationally.  
This phenomenon raises an interesting point concerning the trajectory of economic           
thought. After Adam Smith, economics started down the path of narrowing its scope. Smith              
wrote about the whole person in ​The Theory of Moral Sentiments ​including notions of empathy,               
compassion, and fairness. Ricardo’s Iron Law of Wages was a macabre view of equilibrium in               
the long term, and he believed that there was no alternative to this solution; people were fated to                  
live in the reality illustrated by the model. The marginalists believed they answered a question of                
morality with the theory of diminishing marginal utility. Employers and landowners no longer             
had to worry about the appropriate or just wage for their workers. Instead, they were paid what                 
they were worth, which was measured in terms of production. Wicksell and Marshall further              
narrowed economics despite working on macroscopic ideas like supply and demand, and gross             
domestic product. The theory moved ahead and was being constantly refined, but its             
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representation of reality was already lacking in the early 20th century. Then, with the              
development of game theory, human behavior was reduced to mathematical equations at great             
cost. Von Neumann and Morgenstern based their seminal work on the assumption that economic              
agents​ ​are​ ​perfectly​ ​rational​ ​and​ ​self-interested.  
Perhaps the narrowing of economics can partially be explained by the types of             
individuals drawn towards the discipline. Since recent experimental data demonstrate that           
economists perform more rationally in certain tasks, then economics could have become an echo              
chamber of people self-selecting to a field that made sense to them. The assumption of rationality                
at the foundation of game theory might be less of a convenient axiom to allow for the theory to                   
work, and more of an actual belief held by the two economists. First of all, the calculations made                  
in the article describing game theory are complicated and intricate even with the broad              
assumptions about humanity. In addition, von Neumann and Morgenstern were rather eccentric            
characters whose ideas went beyond the realm of economics. Von Neumann served as an advisor               
on​ ​the​ ​US​ ​Atomic​ ​Energy​ ​Commission,​ ​playing​ ​a​ ​large​ ​role​ ​in​ ​the​ ​nuclear​ ​arms​ ​race.  
The narrowing could have been more than just a natural tendency for a new discipline to                
become more refined and theoretical. The economists themselves could have shaped the progress             
of economics, their inclination to act more rationally being expressed in the models they              
developed. Their worldview could have been a projection of how they reason and frame              
decision-making. In other words, in the minds of the economists rationality was not a baseless,               
overarching assumption but a generally accurate representation of reality. For instance, if they             
were to play the ultimatum game, they would be more likely to offer a very small split of the                   
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money and accept a low offer as well. Using this perspective, it becomes easier to understand the                 
progress​ ​of​ ​economics​ ​and​ ​how​ ​it​ ​arrived​ ​at​ ​the​ ​conclusions​ ​of​ ​game​ ​theory.  
The bold assertions regarding utility maximization and rational behavior attracted the           
attention of psychologists and critics alike. Research on heuristics demonstrated that information            
processing is influenced by framing and context effects. People utilize cognitive shortcuts to             
efficiently make judgments and consider certain cues over others. Instead of paying attention to              
all relevant information as a perfectly rational agent would do, cognitive processes narrow down              
the salient features, reducing cognitive load, in order to make a decision. Prospect theory              
suggests that individuals weight probability when given risky choices. A five percent probability             
is not precisely five percent in people’s minds but rather a subjective perception of five percent                
which​ ​typically​ ​corresponds​ ​to​ ​a​ ​higher​ ​probability.  
The research in this area picked up rapidly after the 1970s. Experimental results showed              
consistent departures from rationality when observing human behavior. Traditional economic          
models were unable to account for most people’s behavior. Individuals were less self-interested             
than anticipated and showed a strong concern for others and fairness. Although prospect theory              
has yet to overtake expected utility theory as the mainstream explanation for choice under risk,               
economists began developing social preference models. These models incorporate a component           
of concern for others and social welfare, in addition to personal welfare, in utility functions.               
However, simply adding a variable to account for prosocial behaviors does not resolve the issue               
at​ ​the​ ​core​ ​of​ ​economics.  
Many economists’ initial reactions to behavioral economics were that these experiments           
exploited anomalies in human behavior. They believed that, in general, the majority of             
 
Broda​ ​78 
individuals would act rationally and make decisions predicted by economic models.           
Additionally, they argued that these trivial errors in rationality would disappear on the aggregate              
when analyzing the entire market. Unfortunately, the violations of self-interest and rationality            
found in the experimental data indicate a pattern or trend in similar errors. As Ariely notes, the                 
research​ ​shows​ ​systematic​ ​and​ ​predictable​ ​deviations​ ​from​ ​economic​ ​theory​ ​(2010).   103
Some of the confusion regarding this issue may arise from semantics. Behavioral            
economics challenges the assumption of rationality in economics and illustrates a refined and             
realistic picture of human behavior. However, the term “rationality” in this case is defined by               
economists and has specific implications for the field. Heuristic research and other experiments             
are not arguing that people are completely irrational. Rather, they do not behave rationally in an                
economic sense. Despite people not acting fully rationally, it is still possible to model              
decision-making, investigate choice under risk, and accurately predict behavior. In order for that             
to happen, economics should take a serious look at psychological data and concepts. Ultimately,              
economics is studying human behavior in a market setting. Psychology can significantly improve             
predictions and refine neoclassical economic models. In fact, behavioral economics has not been             
the only new field to arise from the controversy involving rationality. The list also includes               
experimental​ ​economics,​ ​identity​ ​economics,​ ​and​ ​neuroeconomics.  
As outlined in the first chapter, economics has undergone a trajectory of narrowing its              
scope. This led to abstract and theoretical models that did not accurately represent human              
behavior. Using behavioral economic research as a starting point, progress in economics depends             
on incorporating ideas and findings from experimental data. Economics has narrowed itself            
103​ ​Ariely,​ ​D.​ ​(2009).​ ​​Predictably​ ​Irrational​.​ ​New​ ​York:​ ​HarperCollins. 
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enough and must now broaden its approach by embracing psychological concepts and attempt to              
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